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ABSTRACT
OTHER TRANSACTION AUTHORITIES:
EVALUATING INNOVATION POLICY IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE CONTRACT
VEHICLES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dolores Kuchina-Musina
Old Dominion University, 2022
Director: Dr. Wie Yusuf

Since 1958, government agencies have used Other Transactions (OT) to encourage
innovation and the development of new technology. OTs' purpose is to help government
agencies acquire leading-edge technology from private sector sources in a flexible, goal-oriented
manner. This dissertation is a pilot study assessing whether innovation policies, specifically 10
USC 2371b (Pub. L. No. 114-92, 2015) that authorizes DoD prototype OTs, influence the
Department of Defense (DoD) alternative contracting activities to promote the development of
innovative technologies and products. Using existing literature and interrupted time series
analysis, this dissertation examines publicly available contract data to answer the following
research question: how can innovation policy outcomes, in the form of other transaction
authorities, influence alternative contracting activities to promote the development of innovative
technologies and products? Based on the results and the three hypotheses examined, there is
support for the research question because the analysis of the award data of OTs showed a
statistically significant increase in the number of DoD Prototype awards from 2008-2020.
Findings from this study will contribute to the current literature and encourage research from
more diverse fields to promote policy innovation and provide policymakers a method of
assessing innovation policies using quantitative methods.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In 1960, the United States (US) accounted for 69% of global Research & Development
(R&D), with US defense-related R&D alone accounting for more than one-third of global R&D
(Schwartz & Peters, 2019). During this time, the US federal government funded approximately
twice as much R&D as the private sector. According to Moshe Schwartz and Heidi M. Peters,
“… from 1960 to 2016, the US share of global R&D fell to 28%, and the US federal
government’s share of total US R&D fell from 65% to 24%, while business’s share more than
doubled from 33% to 67%” (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 11).
These declining trends raise concerns because historically, the US government has driven
innovation by investing in emerging, and sometimes risky, developing technologies. The
ramifications and success of many of these government investments are hard to overstate. As
highlighted by Mazzucato (2015), government investments “have proved transformative,
creating entirely new markets and sectors, including the Internet, nanotechnology,
biotechnology, and clean energy” (Mazzucato, 2015, p. 4). These declining trends are causing
US policymakers to become increasingly concerned about the relationship between innovation
and government investment.
Lawmakers are also concerned about the relationship between innovation and
government investment, due to how critical nature of technological innovation from an economic
and national security perspective. A more competitive country in international markets may
increase technological innovation demand to ensure security for the nation (Taylor, 2016). This
is because competitive countries use competition among private sector organizations to their
advantage to fund new entrants and leverage their innovative solutions to current advancements,
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such as cybersecurity. Leveraging new entrants to the Department of Defense (DoD)
marketplace is a challenge for the DoD because of the numerous entry barriers created by the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Federal statutes.
Recognizing these trends, Congress established a new type of agreement for the DoD
called Other Transaction (OT) agreements. OTs are excluded from most federal procurement
laws and regulations. These exemptions decrease the barriers of entry and exclude clauses that
are problematic such as clauses related to intellectual property rights. Additionally, OTs have
flexibility resembling private sector (business-to-business) contracts, which are constructed to
meet the needs of the parties and the project. Lastly, OTs can provide the DoD significant
benefits by attracting new companies -specifically nontraditional contractors -establishing a
resource pool with other entities to facilitate the development of innovative technology products
and having the DoD invest in the development of these innovative technology products.
Background of the Problem
R&D, defined by the Oxford dictionary, is work that is directed toward the innovation,
introduction, and improvement of products and processes (see Table 15 for a list of definitions
and acronyms). The declining trend in funding R&D is troubling because R&D efforts are
proven to lead to innovations like the internet and cell phones (Link, 2006). In addition to R&D,
the terms innovation and technology must also be defined for the purposes of this dissertation.
Innovation is a new method, idea, or product; in other words, innovation can be either a product
or a process (Borrás & Edquist, 2013). Technology is the application of new knowledge and
innovation from research and development efforts. The link between the three terms is vital
because R&D leads to innovation and technological change (Link, 2006; Vonortas, Rouge, &
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Aridi, 2014). The necessity to manage innovation and technological change has thus become an
essential consideration for policymakers.
Innovation policy is a relatively new term when discussing the policy-making agenda
(Edler & Fagerberg, 2017). The term innovation policy has historically gone under many
different labels; “such as industrial policy, science policy, research policy, or technology policy”
(Edler & Fagerberg, 2017, p. 5). For purposes of this dissertation, innovation policy is any policy
that promotes innovation. This definition includes policies that directly support innovation using
funding mechanisms such as grants, contracts, or indirect support such as incentive tax programs
for the private sector matching the private firm’s expenditure with public funding (Vonortas et
al., 2014). Understanding innovation policy has become increasingly important. For example,
“from the 1970s onward, Douglas North, Robert Thomas, Nathan Rosenberg, and other
economic historians argued that innovation was aided by specific government institutions and
policies” (Taylor, 2016, p. 307). The decrease in federal funding for R&D can be an indicator of
the actions of public agencies. These combined actions of public agencies, whether direct or
indirect, are innovation policy because they affect innovation in one way or another (Borrás &
Edquist, 2013). Understanding the impact of innovation policy is crucial to help stimulate
policies that address societal challenges such as cybersecurity, climate change, unemployment,
and inequality.
The government can directly support innovation through robust innovation policies that
leverage grants and contracts with agency-controlled funding (Vonortas et al., 2014). The federal
government typically uses procurement contracts, which are contracts that are awarded according
to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), to procure goods and services. However,
innovation policy has also been known to promote alternative contracting vehicles similar to how
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the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), and the DoD have done in the past (i.e., Space Race, internet, Global
Positioning System (GPS), and Siri) (Mazzucato, 2015). A great example of using alternative
contracting vehicles occurred when President Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958 (PL 85-568) Section 203 (b)(5), granting NASA the authority to “…enter into
and perform such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other transactions as may be
necessary in the conduct of its work and on such terms as it may deem appropriate…” This
provision provided NASA a flexible contract vehicle, known as other transactions, to procure
innovative technology to combat the threat of the Soviet Union. This was the first mention of
other transactions as an alternative contracting method for the federal government (Hanson,
2005; Lopes, 2018; Schwartz & Peters, 2018). Today OTs are used by twelve government
agencies, including the DoD 1.
Significance of the Study
Since 1958, OTs have been used to encourage innovation and the development of new
technology. The term OT refers to any kind of transaction other than a procurement contract,
grant, or cooperative agreement (See 10 USC 2371). Although OTs are not a new concept, they
are considered an alternative contracting vehicle for government agencies, such as the DoD. The
implementation of these contracting vehicle policies has experienced a few changes over the
years through the expansion of authority through the National Defense Authorization Acts
(NDAA), a series of US federal laws specifying the annual business and expenditures of the

1

See Appendix A for a Figure 6 titled Federal Other Transaction Authorities Per Agency.
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DoD. Using a federal reporting system called Federal Procurement Data System – Next
Generation (FPDS-NG), Congressional Research Services (CRS) found that, despite the small
percentage of obligations to OTs ($2.1B), the use of OTs is increasing quickly and is expected to
grow. The 2019 report found that from Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 to FY2017 (2012-2016), the
number of new prototype OT agreements increased from twelve prototype agreements in 2012 to
94 prototype agreements in just four years (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 11). One explanation for
this increase, according to CRS discussions with the DoD Officials, is due to Congress
expanding the statutory authority (p. 11).
The purpose of OTs is to help the government agencies acquire leading-edge technology
from private sector sources using a flexible, goal-oriented manner to foster new relationships
through public-private partnerships. The three main benefits of OTs to the private sector are the
decreased cost and time of the acquisition process, an increase in negotiating power for
intellectual property rights, and more cooperation between the public and private sector
(Schwartz & Peters, 2018). This push for more cooperation between sectors and even between
private sector firms positions the cooperative model (Bozeman, Crow, & Tucker, 1999) as a lens
to examine innovation policies similar to those promoting alternative contracting methods.
In November of 1989, Congress enacted Section 251 of Public Law 101-189, codified in
10 USC 2371, giving DARPA authority to conduct research and technology developments using
cooperative agreements and other transactions. Congress later expanded this authority to the
entire DoD to provide the department with the necessary flexibility to incorporate commercial
industry standards and best practices into its award vehicle. Before 2015, the two types of DoD
OTs were science and technology (S&T) authority and prototype authority (Section 845 PL 103-
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160). Today, there are three separate OT authorities which are used in different scenarios
depending on the DoD’s needs:
•

10 USC 2371 (Research OT) – used for basic, applied, and advanced research
projects when procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement is not feasible or
appropriate.

•

10 USC 2371b (Prototyping OT) – used for prototyping directly relevant to DoD
mission requiring either one third (1/3) cost share or significant nontraditional
defense contractor (NDC) participation, and

•

10 USC 2371b(f) (Production OT) – used for follow-on production contract or
transactions authorized when: a) competitive procedures are used for the selection of
parties for participation in the transaction; and b) the participants in the transaction
successfully completed the prototype project provided by the transaction.

The passing of the most recent authority, 10 USC 2371b, is vital because prior to 2015,
the DoD used Section 845 of Public Law 103-160, as amended, which authorized the use of OTs,
under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 2371. This authority was used under certain circumstances for
prototype projects directly relevant to weapons or weapon systems proposed to be acquired or
developed by the DoD. After 2015, the Section 845 authority for prototype agreements was
superseded by 10 USC 2373b.
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The 2016 Annual Industrial Capabilities Report 2 stated that Congress believed OTs could
support the DoD’s efforts to access new contractors of technological innovation, specifically
with Silicon Valley startup firms and small commercial firms. The government’s utilization of
innovative companies in these alternative contracting vehicles is also critical because the
government can create markets and engage private organizations that do not typically do
business with the government. Thus, resulting in innovative technologies and products that are
public goods.
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions
This dissertation is a pilot study with a purpose to assess whether innovation policies,
specifically 10 USC 2371b (Pub. L. No. 114-92, 2015), influence the DoD alternative
contracting activities to promote the development of innovative technologies and products and
fill the gap of academic and practitioner bodies of knowledge. Drawing from existing literature
and using interrupted time series analysis to examine publicly available contract data in FPDSNG, this pilot study will attempt to answer the following research question: how can innovation
policy outcomes in the form of other transaction authorities influence alternative contracting
activities to promote the development of innovative technologies and products?
Theoretical Framework
During the 2016 Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress 3, the DoD
acknowledged that it should take advantage of the private sector’s rapid growth by leveraging

The 2016 Annual Industrial Capabilities report can be retrieved from
https://www.businessdefense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Resources/2016%20AIC%20RTC%2006-27-17%20%20Public%20Release.pdf?ver=2017-06-30-144825-160
2

3 The 2016 Annual Industrial Capabilities report can be retrieved from https://www.businessdefense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Resources/2016%20AIC%20RTC%2006-27-17%20%20Public%20Release.pdf?ver=2017-06-30-144825-160
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innovation created by “nontraditional defense contractors.” 4 In a similar study, a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report GAO-17-644 in July 2017 used data collected from twelve
innovative companies that do not engage in business with the DoD. This report identified six
challenges that deter these companies from doing business with the agency. These challenges
included: 1) complexity of the DoD’s process, 2) unstable budget environment, 3) long
contracting timelines, 4) intellectual property rights concerns, 5) government-specific contract
terms and conditions, and 6) the inexperienced DoD contracting workforce. The DoD
recommended promoting initiatives that make the acquisition process more accessible and
flexible (Sullivan, 2017). Such initiatives included several innovation policies, such as the FY
2016 and 2017 NDAA provisions for the DoD, including the codification of the DoD’s Other
Transaction Authority (10 USC 2371b) for prototypes. This innovation policy authorized the
DoD to award follow-on production contracts for successful prototypes without using
competitive procedures. 5 It is important to note that although it is great to have all these
initiatives and innovation policies to support a solution for the challenges listed above, the real
problem becomes analyzing the outcomes of such initiatives to find if these policies are
promoting innovative technologies and products.
Before analyzing the outcomes of innovation policies, it is vital first to understand the US
government’s level of involvement in promoting innovative technologies and products. Three
policy paradigms can be used to examine the US’s approaches to innovation policy: the market,

4 The United States Code, 10 U.S. Code § 2302(9), defines nontraditional defense contractor as: an entity that is not currently performing and has not performed, for at least the one-year period
preceding the solicitation of sources by the Department of Defense for the procurement or transaction, any contract or subcontract for the Department of Defense that is subject to full coverage
under the cost accounting standards (CAS) prescribed pursuant to section 1502 of title 41 and the regulations implementing such section.

2

See 10 USC 2371b(f)
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mission, and cooperative models (Bozeman, Crow, & Tucker, 1999). Although these three
models were developed for studying R&D policy, they are still applicable when discussing
innovation policy due to the natural crossover (Borrás & Edquist, 2013; Edler & Fagerberg,
2017). The models depicted are based on the level of involvement the government should have in
regulating and influencing private sector behavior (Bozeman et al., 1999). The role the
government plays determines the model applicable to the specific paradigm. The market model
applies market failure as the reason the government sponsors R&D efforts. The mission model
assumes that the government should perform the innovative services of specific missions which
cannot be efficiently served by the private sector (e.g., defense and national security-related
innovation). Lastly, the cooperative model is a new model in which the government has a more
active role in performing research and developing innovative technology and products for
private-sector consumption or by merely being a funding vehicle for R&D efforts.
The challenges presented in GAO’s report GAO-17-644 demonstrate the numerous
problems the DoD has encountered, preventing the DoD from attracting innovative contractors to
collaborate to develop new national defense technologies. Applying these three models can help
understand the importance of the suggested initiatives in the GAO report and how innovation
policies influence the DoD’s contracting activities.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Innovation Policy and Public and Private Roles
Governments, donors, and other practitioners in the development community are keen to
determine program effectiveness with broad goals such as increasing innovative technologies
and products in the US. Innovation policy is a relatively new term when discussing the policymaking agenda (Edler & Fagerberg, 2017). Innovation policy has numerous definitions because
“much of what is called innovation policy today may previously have gone under labels such as
industrial policy, science policy, research policy, or technology policy (Edler & Fagerberg, 2017,
p. 5). For example, Edler and Fagerberg (2017) note that to determine the origins of the terms,
one must decide if the phrase uses the qualifier “innovation,” or the impact of the policy is
innovation (Edler & Fagerberg, 2017). For this study, innovation policy is described as any
policy that promotes innovation. This definition includes policies that directly support innovation
using funding mechanisms such as grants and contracts or indirect support such as incentive tax
programs for the private sector matching the private firm’s expenditure with public funding
(Vonortas et al., 2014). This distinction is necessary because it highlights the need to assess how
an intervention affects outcomes.
Another important connection is how innovation policy is implemented, specifically with
the influence of public versus private sector. The challenges presented in GAO’s report GAO-17644 demonstrate the problems the DoD has encountered, preventing it from attracting innovative
contractors to collaborate in the development of technologies for national defense. The
challenges highlighted above, and the need for public and private sectors to work together,
demonstrate how neither the market model nor mission model is efficient in promoting
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innovation. Rather, these illustrate the assumptions of the cooperative model. The government
can have an active part in developing innovative technologies and products.
An interest in policy and innovation led to inquiries into studies examining the
relationship between policy and innovation. “From the 1970s onward, Douglas North, Robert
Thomas, Nathan Rosenberg, and other economic historians argued that innovation was aided by
specific government institutions and policies” (Taylor, 2016, p. 307). Policy implementation is
the process of carrying out a government decision (Berman, 1978) by transforming a policy idea
into an action intended to alleviate a social problem (Lester & Goggin, 1998). These actions may
result in programs, procedures, or regulations (DeGroff & Cargo, 2009). One way policymakers
can use policy to promote innovation is by using public procurement to stimulate innovative
activity, especially among small businesses (Vonortas et al., 2014, p. 16). Examining the
outcomes of OTs can provide insight into how policy can promote the development of innovative
technologies and products.
The connection between innovation and public-private partnerships is inherent
(Roumboutsos & Saussier, 2014) because the relationship calls for the two sectors to “jointly
develop products and services and share risks, costs and resources which are connected with
these products” (van Ham and Koppenjan, 2002, p. 598). As a result, positive outcomes and
some type of efficiency gains through the private sector’s involvement in providing goods and
services should occur. Roumboutsos & Saussier (2014) pointed out that public-private
partnerships allow for sharing resources, knowledge, and risks to support innovation in ways
traditional contracting activities cannot (Roumboutsos & Saussier, 2014). Scholars have echoed
the importance of the alignment of goals and values in public-private partnerships to help ensure
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that the public goals are met using this type of arrangement (Clark, Heilman, & Johnson, 1997;
Kettl, 1993; Lombard & Morris, 2012; Savas & Savas, 2000).
OTs provide an alternative contracting method that promotes more shared interest
between the public and private sectors through the innovation policies enacted by Congress. For
example, Congressional actions that expanded definitions of nontraditional defense contractors,
to include small business and expanding the scope of prototype projects (Pub. L. No. 113- 291,
2014), influence how the DoD implements these policies through alternate contracting activities
(i.e., OTs). To understand why OTs are the alternative, one must first be familiar with the
procurement contract.
The Procurement Contract Approach
The procurement contract is a top-down regulated approach to procure goods and
services from the private sector. These regulations are adopted by any agency that desires to do
business with the private sector. As mentioned previously, OTs are not subject to the same
regulations and rely heavily on the contracting officers’ discretion to enforce and shape the
policy governing these types of transactions. The procurement contract method of the acquisition
process, Figure 1, begins with the DoD determining a need. Per the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR) Part 7, before the DoD acquires a product or service, it must conduct market
research to determine which solution is most suitable to meet the specific need. Next, the DoD
contracting officer will use the FAR and Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
to procure the product or service based on the type of product they seek to obtain. For example,
“DoD may use commercial item acquisition procedures under FAR Part 12 to procure
commercially available products and negotiated contract procedures under FAR Part 15 for
military-unique products” (Sullivan, 2017, p.4). These sections of the FAR provide a process,
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guidelines, and applicable exceptions for contracting officers to follow in their decision-making
process.
As identified in GAO-17-644, the current acquisition process is lengthy and complicated,
resulting in a barrier for private sector companies to do business with the public sector. To put
this into perspective, “in January 2017, the Army Contracting Command established standard
contracting timelines that ranged from 55 days (about two months) for contracts valued less than
$25,000 to 700 days (about 24 months) for contracts valued over $1 billion” (Sullivan, 2017, p.
13). As a comparison, data collected by the U.S. Air Force show that in the fiscal year 2016, it
took an average of nearly 13 months from the time a request for proposal was issued until an
award decision was made for 52 sole-source contracts valued between $50 million and $500
million” (Sullivan, 2017, pp. 13-14). For companies seeking a vehicle to complete R&D and
prototyping efforts, this length of time can be a significant constraint.

Figure 1
Procurement Contract Method of the Acquisition Process

Note. This procurement contract method in the acquisition process can be broken into a threephase approach: pre-solicitation, solicitation, and source selection phase.
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The contract terms and conditions can also be a significant deterrent. Per the FAR,
DFARS, and the DoD policies, the standard terms and conditions for DoD contracts are unique
to the government. An example of this is a requirement in FAR Part 30 for companies to
establish a government-unique cost accounting system when awarded cost-type contracts. The
cost accounting system allows companies to disclose their costs in a specific manner to ensure
consistency and accountability. An example provided in GAO-17-644, one company stated it
took them “at least 15-18 months and cost millions to establish a government-unique cost
accounting system” (Sullivan, 2017, p. 17). Government officials must track requirements from
both a compliance and a liability standpoint. Combined, this results in an increased cost for the
private sector and deters businesses from working with the government.
One of the critiques of the top-down model is that it is weak when there is “no dominant
policy, but rather a multitude of governmental directives and actors, none of the preeminent”
(Sabatier, 1983, p.30). The necessary discretion needed to utilize OTs make them an attractive
alternate contracting method for the DoD amongst the challenges facing innovation policy.
Other Transaction (OT) Approach
The 2016 Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress stated that Congress
believed OTs are attractive for companies that do not generally engage in contracting with the
government due to entry barriers and the “one size fits all” regulations governing defense
procurements. The 2016 report also stated that OTs could support the DoD’s efforts to attract
new technological innovation offerings, specifically from Silicon Valley startup firms and small
commercial firms.
Procurement contracts must follow the appropriate federal procurement laws and
regulations. Conversely, OTs are legally binding contracts exempt from federal procurement
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laws and regulations (e.g., Competition in Contracting Act and Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR)). Most Federal Government acquisition statutes and regulations are not applicable to the
OT authority, permitting more flexibility and freedom to contracting officials. For example, the
private sector companies are not subject to follow the Government accounting rules (also known
as Cost and Accounting Standards (CAS) as prescribed by FAR part 30). In other words, the
contract resembles a private sector (B2B) contract as the terms and conditions are negotiable.
The DoD Other Transaction Guide for Prototype Projects (2018) states, “this acquisition
authority, when used appropriately, is a vital tool that will help the Department to lower barriers
to attract nontraditional defense contractors and increase access to commercial solutions for
defense requirements” (p. i).
OTs intend to provide benefits to the DoD such as attracting nontraditional contractors
(as defined by 48 CFR § 212.001), establish a network for resources to develop and/or obtain
innovative technologies, and provide an instrument for the DoD to influence technology and
innovation as it did in the past. There are three types of OTs: Research, Prototype, and
Production. Table 1 provides a comparison of the three. The different types of OTs specific to
the DoD are in two sections of the law: 10 USC 2371 and 10 USC 2371b. The authority in 10
USC 2371 grants DoD the authority to use other transactions to conduct basic, applied, and
advanced research projects. DoD regulations do not treat these projects as contracts, instead, the
DoD treats these projects as financial assistance instruments. 10 USC 2371b permits the use of
other transactions to conduct prototype projects and follow-on production (see Table 1). The two
right columns are highlighted because they are the focus of this study - examining how
innovation policy outcomes influence alternative contracting activities to promote the
development of innovative technologies and products.
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Table 1
Research, Prototype, and Production OT Comparison Chart
Research OT

Prototype OT

Production OT

Regulation

10 U.S.C. 2371

10 U.S.C. 2371b
(Previously in Section 845 P.L. 103160)

10 U.S.C. 2371b(f)

Purpose

Conduct research

Develop prototypes

Follow-on
production of a
successful
prototype project

Applicability

Basic, applied, and
advanced research.

Prototype projects that are directly
relevant to enhancing mission
effectiveness of military personnel,
simplicity platform, systems,
components, or material to be
acquired by DoD, and/or respective
improvements

Follow-on contract
after a successful
prototype OT.

Restrictions

No duplication of
research of the
maximum extent
practicable.

One of the following must apply:
All participants are small or
nontraditional business; or

Can be conducted
only if:
The underlying
prototype OT was
competitively
awarded; and

A standard contract,
grant, cooperative
agreement not
appropriate.

All significant participants must be
small or nontraditional; or
At least 1/3 of the total cost of the
prototype project is provided by a
nongovernment participant; or
The senior procurement acquisition
official provides a written
explanation of exception and
justification of OT award.

Cost Sharing

50/50 cost share

Competition Competition to the
Requirement maximum extent
practicable.

The prototype
project was
successfully
completed

Cost-share conditionally required.

NA

Competition to the maximum extent
practicable.

Not required if
competitive
procedures were
used in the
Prototype OT.
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OTs as a Cooperative Model
Before analyzing the outcomes of innovation policies, it is vital first to understand the US
government’s level of involvement in promoting innovative technologies and products. Three
policy paradigms can be used to examine the US’s approaches to innovation policy: the market,
mission, and cooperative models. A summary of three models associated with each paradigm is
shown below in Table 2 developed for examining R&D policy (Bozeman et al., 1999). Although
these three models were developed for studying R&D policy, they are still applicable when
discussing innovation policy because innovation policy includes R&D policy (Borrás & Edquist,
2013; Edler & Fagerberg, 2017).
These three models are based on the level of involvement the government should have in
regulating and influencing private sector behavior (Bozeman et al., 1999). The role the
government plays determines the model applicable to the specific paradigm. The market model
applies market failure as the reason the government sponsors R&D efforts. The mission model
assumes that the government should perform the innovative services of specific missions which
cannot be efficiently served by the private sector (e.g., defense and national security-related
innovation). Lastly, the cooperative model is a new model in which the government has a more
active role in performing research and developing innovative technology and products for
private-sector consumption or by merely being a funding vehicle for R&D efforts.
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Table 2
Three Competing Innovation Policy Models
Market Model

Mission Model

Cooperative Model

1. Markets are most
efficient allocator of
information and
technology.
2. Government role
limited to market
failures such as
extensive
Core
externalities; high
Assumptions
transaction costs; and
information
distortions. Small,
mission domain,
chiefly in defense.
3. Innovation flows from
and to private sector,
minimal government
role.

1. The government role
should be closely tied
to authorized
programmatic missions
of agencies.
2. Government R&D is
limited to missions of
agencies, but not
confined to defense.
3. Government should not
compete with private
sector in innovation
and technology. But a
government role in
connection with
traditional activities of
line agencies.

1. Markets not always
the most efficient
route to innovation
and economic growth.
2. Global economy
requires more
centralized planning
and broader support
for civilian
technology
development.
4. 3. Government can
play a role in
developing
technology, especially
pre-competitive
technology, for use in
the private sector.

Peak
Influence

Highly influential during
all periods

1945-1965; 1992- present.

1992-1994

Policy
Examples

De-regulation; contraction
of government role; R&D
tax credits; capital gains
tax roll back. Little or no
need for federal
laboratories except in
defense support.

Creation of energy policy
R&D, agricultural labs, and
other such broad mission
frameworks.

Expansion of federal
laboratory roles in
technology transfer and
cooperative research;
manufacturing extension
policies.

Neo-classical economics.

Traditional liberal
governance with broad
definition of government
role.

Industrial policy theory.

Theoretical
Roots
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During the 1980s, the US experienced economic uncertainty, and scholars began to reexamine the private sector’s role in innovation. The market failure paradigm began to lose its
luster, and scholars needed a new way of assessing innovation policy. The challenger to the
market failure paradigm was the cooperative model, which emphasized cooperation among
sectors (Bozeman et al., 1999). This is important to note in the innovation policy timeline as the
DoD assessed its challenges in the development of innovative technologies and products. As
aforementioned, Congress enacted Section 251 of Public Law 101-189, codified in 10 USC 2371
in 1989, which provided DARPA the authority to conduct research and technology developments
using cooperative agreements and other transactions. At the time, this authority as only granted
for a two-year pilot program. In 1991, the National Defense Authorization Act of FY1992
extended 10 USC 2371 authority to other DoD agencies and made it permanent. This was the
first major expansion of authority for OTs because it enabled other departments in the DoD to
use OTs for their efforts.
The DoD’s procurement contract method of promoting innovation is an excellent
example of the market failure model and the mission model. The market failure paradigm has
been the dominant model for innovation policy by assuming that if there is a need for innovation,
then the private sector will “sense the need and respond in an economically efficient manner”
(Bozeman et al., 1999, p. 6). Thus, for any non-mission specific contracts, the DoD applies the
market failure paradigm. The mission model becomes applicable for contracts that are missionspecific contracts (e.g., weapons systems). The mission paradigm assumes that the agency
mission should derive innovation policy resulting in innovative products. These two models
apply to the procurement contract method because they are not significantly different and are the
most used innovation policy models.

20
The procurement contract method is a top-down regulated approach to procure goods and
services from the private sector. A procurement contract is a contract awarded according to the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Regulations governing the procurement contract method
(i.e., the FAR, Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), and the Bayh-Dole Act) are adopted by any
government agency that desires to do business with the private sector. This procurement contract
approach should be familiar to scholars accustomed to the Mazmanian and Sabatier paradigm of
the “single-authority top-down” methodology (Hjern & Hull, 1982). In this approach,
“implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually made in a statute”
(Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981, p. 540). Government support is proposed once a market failure is
identified (Mazzucato, 2015). Later this government support is evaluated as an investment, and
value is assessed using cost/benefit analysis. The six challenges identified in GAO-17-644 apply
to the procurement contract method, another example of the top-down model.
As the cooperative model’s popularity grew, the innovative policy promoting OTs as an
alternative contract method evolved. Two years later, the National Defense Authorization Act of
FY1994 (PL 103-160) expanded the OT authority for DARPA to include prototype projects
related to weapons or weapons systems procured or developed for a DoD agency. This was
significant because the extension of authority allowed OTs as a procurement method rather than
a stimulant for research efforts. This legislation is the second major expansion of authority for
OTs because it changed how the DoD was using OTs. Three years later, the National Defense
Authorization Act of FY1997 (PL 104-201) extended Section 845 prototype authority to the
remainder of DoD.
Over the next two decades, the authority of OTs was both expanded and restrained by
enacting additional clarifications and reporting requirements for transparency and accountability
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of DoD agencies. These reporting requirements included annual reports that would include a
description of the transaction, the reason for not using a contract or grant to support the research,
the amount of the payment, and other requirements.
The next major expansion of authority for OTs occurred nearly 20 years after the first
major event, the National Defense Authorization Act of FY1994 (PL 103-160). In 2014, Carl
Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for FY2015 (PL
113-291) expanded OT authority to include prototypes “directly related to enhancing the mission
effectiveness of military personnel and supporting platforms, systems, components, or materials
proposed to be acquired or developed by the Depart of Defense, or improvements of platforms,
systems, components, or materials in use by the Armed Forces.” Before this, OTs could only be
used for weapons and weapons systems.
In 2015, the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2016 (PL 114-92) codified
prototype OTs in 10 USC 2371b thereby rescinding the authority under Section 845, redefines
and codifies nontraditional defense contractors in 10 USC 2302(9), and expands follow-on
production (10 USC 2371b(f). This legislation is the fourth major expansion of authority and is
the focus of this study on how this innovation policy has promoted the development of
innovative technologies and products. To highlight the importance of this study, it is important to
review key previous research efforts over the last few decades, which is discussed in the
following section.
The amount of the investment depends on available funding, and with the trends of the
last several decades, the decline in funding for innovation has caused great concern. This is
where the mission model and market model are challenged. Available financing combined with
the DoD’s problem of not attracting innovative firms, can create a call for action. These
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challenges and the need for public and private sectors to work together illustrate the cooperative
model’s assumptions that the market is not always the most efficient way of promoting
innovation.
For this reason, the cooperative model has gained interest, especially in the application in
the commercialization of technology (Bozeman et al., 1999) and when addressing intellectual
property and the government becoming a partner in developing the technology. These are not
new topics and are found in numerous federal reports such as the reports mentioned above, the
2019 CRS report (R45521), and the 2017 GAO report (Sullivan, 2017).
Scholars such as Hjern and Hull (1982) that support the bottom-up approach to policy
argue that examining only the perspective of “central” decision-makers neglects other actors that
play roles in policy implementation (Sabatier, 1986). In a similar manner, one of the top-down
model’s critiques is that the model is weak when there is “no dominant policy, but rather a
multitude of governmental directives and actors, none of the preeminent” (Sabatier, 1986, p. 30).
OTs provide a bottom-up emphasis, giving significant decision-making power to public
administrators. These public administrators have considerable influence in shaping and enacting
policy on the ground, especially when it lacks clear direction on its implementation (Hill, 2003).
However, difficulties may occur in implementing policy in cases where “implementing agents
know multiple ways to implement a policy and must choose among them” (Hill, 2003, p. 5). One
significant reason is that OTs are not subject to the same rules and rely heavily on the contracting
professionals’ discretion to enforce and shape the policy governing these types of transactions.
The authority provided by 10 USC 2371b gives contracting professionals decision-making power
versus the regulation-driven procurement contract method.
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OTs’ appeal is that they are not procurement contracts and are an alternative contracting
method consistently highlighted to help alleviate these types of concerns. Additionally, OTs are
designed to promote shared interests between the public and private sectors through Congress’s
several innovation policies. For example, Congressional actions that expanded definitions of
nontraditional defense contractors to include small businesses and increasing the scope of
prototype projects (Pub. L. No. 113- 291, 2014) influence how the DoD implements these
policies. Additionally, these policies impact alternate contracting methods (i.e., OTs) to promote
innovative technologies and products. This study will look specifically at the policy passed in
2015 in which Congress made OT authority permanent by codifying the law at 10 USC 2371b
(Pub. L. No. 114-92, 2015). By using the cooperative model as a lens to examine how innovation
policies such as 10 USC 2371b influence DoD alternate contracting activities, this study will also
explore how this policy can promote innovative technologies and products using interrupted time
series analysis.
Previous Research on OT Authority Policy
As mentioned by 2019 CRS Report R45521, limited attention has been paid to
researching the use of OTs and their effectiveness. Although, relevant research has been
prevalent for nearly 30 years, the findings have not been easily accessible to practitioners and
academics, and most of the research is prior to the enactment of the 10 USC 2371b in 2015. This
is significant because, as previously mentioned, 10 USC 2371b rescinded the authority under Sec
845 meaning that any studies that examined prototype authority under Section 845 have minimal
applicability to the impact of the current prototype authority under 10 USC 2371b. However,
themes from previous studies can be used to examine the current innovation policy.
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One way to illustrate this is by focusing the review on published literature by doing a
search using online queries in Old Dominion University’s Library Database. This review used
keywords such as “other transaction authority” and “Department of Defense” with the criteria
that the articles were also from peer reviewed journals. The query yielded twenty-six articles
from various sources. In addition to finding these articles, a search using similar keywords was
performed to include some practitioner research.
Most of the published OT literature reviewed was either practitioner-oriented (Bloch &
McEwen, 2001; Dix, Lavallee, & Welch, 2003; Dunn, 2017; Kuyath, 1995; Vadiee & Garland,
2018), theory based (Schooner, 2002), or metrics based (Fike, 2009). The literature in peer
reviewed journals was focused on barriers for DoD’s ability to keep pace with security needs in
the current environment (Bell, 2014; Bonvillian & Van Atta, 2011; Michèle & Robert, 2016;
Nunez, 2017; Peter, 2013; Steinberg, 2020; Steipp & Bezos, 2013), and the legal and
administrative systems that govern OTs (Gunasekara, 2010; Nathaniel, 2019; Nikole, 2019;
Selinger, 2020; Victoria Dalcourt, 2019). Although these research subjects are important when
discussing OTs, none of the OT literature reviewed attempts to systematically identify and
discuss the impact of innovation policy on the DoD’s use of OTs.
Steven Schooner published his contract law desiderata in which he argues that three main
policy goals of the United States procurement system are transparency, procurement integrity,
and competition (Schooner, 2002). Schooner notes that it is important to acknowledge the role of
risk avoidance. Avoiding undue risk is a responsibility of the governing body. However, too
much focus on risk avoidance can stifle creativity and innovation. These observations about the
culture of the DoD and its focus on avoiding undue risk provides some historical context of OTs
as a potential solution to address certain institutional problems.
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Several articles focused on the pros and cons of OTs (Bloch & McEwen, 2001; Dunn,
2017; Kuyath, 1995). Richard Kuyath (1995) is the earliest article developing a way to
understand the pros and cons of OTs using data from program officials (Kuyath, 1995). David
Bloch and James McEwen (2002) identified that OTs were created for three specific goals:
enhancing military technological superiority, streamlining the procurement process, and
integrating civilian and military technology industries (Bloch & McEwen, 2001). In his
discussion in addressing the criticism of OTs, Richard Dunn (2009) provides case studies to help
promote and encourage the DoD’s use of OTs (Dunn, 2017). Gregory Fike (2009) research
attempted to find a reliable quantitative metric to assess DoD’s OT effectiveness. He suggested
several metrics to evaluate the success of an OT such as cost saving, time saved in negotiations,
the procurement timeline, and participation of nontraditional contractors (Fike, 2009). This
article was one of the few articles that attempted to provide actual metrics using a quantitative
approach to measure the effectiveness of OTs.
Articles in the last three years (2017-2020) have been focused on the barriers for DoD’s
ability to keep pace with security needs in the current environment (Nunez, 2017; Steinberg,
2020). Krista Nunez highlights the DoDs use of OTs to protect, defend, and even prevent cyber
threats (Nunez, 2017). Douglas Steinberg (2020) provided more of a historical review of the
need for the DoD to lower the barriers of entry to help accelerate the speed of innovation
(Steinberg, 2020). Both authors echo the need to leverage tools that provide more flexibility
when contracting for innovative technologies and products to be more effective in protecting the
nation’s security.
To illustrate the attention of similar academic studies such as dissertations and thesis a
search for similar studies in the form of thesis and/or dissertations. During a search for similar
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studies performed specifically as a thesis or dissertation, the results based on online queries in
Google search engines and Old Dominion University’s Research Database query yielded seven
theses and one dissertation with similar research purposes. Seven of those studies originated
from the Naval Post Graduate School prior to the enactment of 10 USC 2371b, a graduate
university specifically for DoD professionals. In 2018, the eighth study was published from the
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech). This dissertation was also
unique because it was a study published in the field of Public Administration/Public Affairs. All
studies examined if the OT authority policy was meeting its objective in attracting nontraditional
business to do business with DoD. This dissertation is different as it looks at the direct outcome
as it relates to innovation policy versus examining OTs and reviewing the data using quantitative
methods versus qualitative methods.
The first thesis focused on OT authority policy was published in 1997 by a student at the
Naval Postgraduate School in California. Howell (1997) focused on awards made by DARPA
due to their experience and longevity in using this type of contract vehicle. The researcher
examined these OTs to discuss the objectives that resulted in an OT. The methodology used for
this study included a review of law journals, periodicals, publications, the US Code, and
webpage literature. Additionally, the researcher performed interviews with DARPA’s General
Counsel, Contracting Officers, and Heads of Technical Offices. The study concluded that if the
use of OTs increased, it will be able to facilitate technological innovation. The recommendation
included allowing major systems commands to establish procedures and guidance, to collect
feedback and lessons learned at a central location to support a unified direction, and to establish
educational resources for acquisition personnel to help prepare the future acquisition
professionals.

27
In his 1998 theses, Slade focused on the contractor’s perceptions of benefits and
limitations of Section 845 Agreements (Slade, 1998). During this timeframe, OTs for prototypes
were also known as Section 845 Agreements. Like the present version of 10 USC 2371b these
agreements attract nontraditional Government contractors and accelerate the development of
prototypes. Also, Slade categorized the participating businesses as traditional and nontraditional,
identified the perceived benefits of OT for attracting companies to participate in the 1997
Commercial Operation and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI 97) program, and determined if
the businesses would participate in another Section 845 agreement. The study was limited to the
thirty companies that participated in COSSI 97. The methodology used in the study involved a
literature review of DoD publications, academic research, and internet websites. After
completing the list of the thirty (30) COSSI agreements and respective contracts, Slade
conducted phone interviews with professionals and representatives knowledgeable about the
COSSI and performed follow-ups as necessary through email. The study concluded that although
the participants found the agreements to be a useful tool to foster better relations with the
government, the government’s inexperience with the agreement was a significant limitation.
Additionally, the study concluded that only six of the thirty (20%) of the participants in COSSI
97 were nontraditional contractors. Slade (1998) emphasized that these six contractors would not
have done business with the government if the program used a different contract vehicle.
During the same year, Hayes (1998) conducted a study for his thesis to develop a
decision model of DoD buying commands regarding their use of OTs (Hayes, 1998). The
decision model criteria were developed using literature and interview data from buying
authorities in the DoD, DARPA, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) personnel. The study concluded that the business
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decision was the central factor when deciding to use OTs for a specific procurement/acquisition.
The other criteria included the type of product, nontraditional defense contractors, dual-use
technology, cost-share arrangement, and risk analysis. The study concluded with
recommendations to develop quantitative and qualitative performance measures to help identify
if objectives are being met, along with an increase in research of OTs to determine if early
involvement of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMC) would provide an added
benefit and identify the common heuristic and associated biases used in the OT process.
In 1999, the objective of Stamatopoulos’ thesis research was to identify and develop
appraisal metrics to measure the value of Section 845 agreements and how they are used
(Stamatopoulos, 1999). The methodology used in the study involved a literature review of
academic research and internet websites. Stamatopoulos collected agencies and contact
information of Program Managers and Acquisition Professionals engaged in Section 845
agreements. Next, the researcher used surveys and phone interviews from the selected
government agencies.
Stamatopoulos found thirteen standard contract metrics appropriate to Section 845
agreements. Out of those thirteen, he identified four to serve as the core set of parameters. These
four metrics include “attracting nontraditional defense firms, prototype acquisition cycle time,
customer satisfaction and timeliness” (Stamatopoulos, 1999, p. 132). The researcher identified
attracting nontraditional defense firms to be a core OT metric. “Eighty-eight percent of
respondents’ felt the measure was meaningful and indicated it related to their organization’s
goals, 80 percent claimed the metric data was measurable and 67 percent felt it was economical
to collect” (Stamatopoulos, 1999, p. 134). He also stated that although it was a successful
measure, the term “nontraditional” business needed to be better defined to be a valid and reliable
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metric. Stamatopoulos (1999) recommended a future study to conduct a comparative analysis of
other organizations contract metrics, a future quantitative study examining OTs ability to attract
nontraditional contractors (prime and subcontractors), and a future study of how OT data can be
precise, valid, and not a burden to collect.
Gilliand’s (2001) study examined the effectiveness of Section 845 by soliciting
nontraditional companies that participate in OT procurements from 1994 through 2000
(Gilliland, 2001). Effectiveness was analyzed by the number of nontraditional businesses doing
business with the government per Title 10 USC 2371 authority. The study’s methodology
reviewed references and publications at the Naval Postgraduate School, published academic
books and articles, and internet websites. The study found significant gaps in the definition of
“nontraditional” businesses and that the DoD did not track the amount of technology resulting
from OTs’ use. Recommendations included performing a similar study with experience
companies in industries that the DoD does not do business, performing quantitative analysis to
measure OTs’ effectiveness in attractive, nontraditional OTs, and additional education for
contracting officers that execute OTs.
Tucker (2002) focused on Technology Investment agreements (TIAs) to determine the
effectiveness of this contract vehicle to attract private firms to do business with the DoD
(Tucker, 2002). A TIA is a contract instrument used to promote private sector involvement in
pursuing technologies for defense research. TIAs are appropriate when research objectives are
unlikely to be achieved using other types of contract instruments. TIAs may be executed as a
cooperative agreement or a type of assistance transaction other than a grant or cooperative
agreement, such as a Research OT (see 10 USC 2371). The study’s methodology reviewed
references and publications at the Naval Postgraduate School, published academic books and
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articles, and internet websites. DoD Inspector General audits and Dual Use Science and
Technology (DU S&T) Projects that were reviewed ranged from 1997 through 2001. The study
found that TIAs were attracting commercial firms; however, it was not at the degree the
government claimed. Tucker (2002) recommended examining the private sector’s opinion of
TIAs, a comparison of successful and unsuccessful TIAs, an analysis of TIA costs, and a review
of why TIA usage has decreased.
Hanson’s (2005) quantitative research thesis examined DoD reports to determine the
extent to which the OT authority objectives were achieved (Hanson, 2005). The study’s
methodology reviewed references and publications at the Naval Postgraduate School, published
academic books and articles, and internet websites. The analysis examined data from FY1997 –
FY2003 (1996-2002) from the DoD Annual Report to Congress on the Cooperative Agreements,
and OTs found on the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy (OSD DPAP) website. Results of the analysis showed that only 11% of all awarded OTs
went to nontraditional contractors and only “one-tenth of one percent of all DoD ‘Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation’ funding in those fiscal years” (Hanson, 2005, p. v) reached
those same nontraditional contractors. Thus, Hanson concluded that OTs were ineffective at
attracting nontraditional contractors. The study recommends that the DoD “OT Guide” is revised
to identify the funding allocated to nontraditional businesses to allow policymakers and DoD to
track the RDT&E budget. The second recommendation was to encourage DoD and Congress to
“evaluate and quantify the benefits of” (Hanson, 2005, p. 54) OTs.
In 2018, Lopes completed his dissertation using qualitative methods using historical
institutionalism literature to explain why the DoD has not widely used OTs (Lopes, 2018). By
using interviews with DoD employees and contractors, and OT case studies, Lopes offered six
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policy recommendations to promote more extensive use of OTs by the DoD. These six policy
recommendations include establishing a knowledge management resource website, providing
resources such as templates to employees, updating respective policies, mandating FPDS-NG as
a mandatory requirement for unclassified OTs, increasing educational needs for contract and
program professionals, and establish an interagency OT group. Lopes (2018) also notated the
seventh recommendation for academics to conduct additional research “using CPT and the
potential causal mechanisms” (Lopes, 2018, p. 647) from his study.
Common themes are identified while examining these studies. The first is the lack of
quantitative analysis to support the recommendation for “quantifiable” measures (Gilliland,
2001; Hanson, 2005; Hayes, 1998; Stamatopoulos, 1999; Tucker, 2002). Out of the eight studies,
only one was a quantitative study that reviewed annual report data related to DoD OTs (Hanson,
2005). Hanson’s data focused on the OT policy’s ability to attract nontraditional contractors.
The gap for additional quantitative studies to measure how OTs are used was identified in
the 2019 Congressional Report titled, Department of Defense Use of Other Transaction
Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress (CRS R45521 Version 4). As
mentioned previously, the 2019 Congressional Report addressed a concern that there was no
method to analyze the effectiveness of innovation policy efficacy on the way DoD OTs are used.
This pilot study provides a method to look at the implementation of the policy, examines the
policy with the most recent changes, examines how these policy changes affect the award rate of
DoD OTs and understands its effect on alternate contracting methods.
The second theme of these studies is whether the OTs are meeting their objective in
attracting nontraditional businesses. These studies have found that OTs are not meeting the
objective or that the agency has failed to notice how successful the OTs have been at attracting
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nontraditional businesses (Gilliland, 2001; Hanson, 2005; Lopes, 2018; Slade, 1998;
Stamatopoulos, 1999). The attraction of nontraditional business is still a relevant topic and a
growing concern based on the government’s interest as referenced in government reports such as
GAO-16-209, GAO-17-644, and CRS R45521 Version 4.
The third theme describes that although all eight of the studies evaluate the legislative
history of OTs, none of them measure or discuss the impacts of the policy on the usage of OTs.
As Hanson (2005) points out, previous researchers looked at various aspects of OTs, but most
used qualitative methods to review the data (Hanson, 2005). In summary, the OT literature
currently available has an apparent gap of literature using a quantitative research design and
methods to examine and discuss the impact of policy on OT use in DoD. This gap for additional
quantitative studies to measure how OTs are used was identified in the 2019 Congressional
Report titled, Department of Defense Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress (CRS R45521 Version 4). As mentioned previously, the 2019
Congressional Report addressed a concern that there was no method to analyze the effectiveness
of innovation policy efficacy on the way DoD OTs are used. The previous research projects on
OTs included herein are primarily qualitative research designs asserting that OTs eliminate
barriers preventing DoD from tapping into private sector R&D. Thus, gaining access to industry
leaders who traditionally did not do business with the Department of Defense.
This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by providing a documented methodology to
identify and discuss whether innovation policies, such as 10 USC 2371b (Pub. L. No. 114-92,
2015), influence the DoD alternative contracting activities to promote the development of
innovative technologies and products. By examining the innovation policies influence on
alternative contracting activities, this research will also attempt to provide a new perspective
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through the lens of public administration and policy to encourage more research from diverse
fields to promote policy innovation. This pilot study provides a method to look at the
implementation of the policy, examines the policy with the most recent changes, examines how
these policy changes affect the award rate of DoD OTs and understands its effect on alternate
contracting methods.
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CHAPTER III
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Impact evaluation can assess the outcomes of alternative contract vehicles, such as OTs,
resulting from innovation policy and evaluate valid and reliable data using quantitative
approaches such as ex-post and ex-ante analysis. An ex-ante impact evaluation attempts to
measure future programs and policies’ intended impacts, given a targeted area’s current situation,
and involves simulations based on assumptions about how the economy works. Ex-post
assessment defines policy monitoring and evaluation and assesses the process after the policy’s
adoption. This dissertation will be using an ex-post analysis for assessing the impact of DoD OT
authority10 USC 2371b (Pub. L. No. 114-92, 2015).
Research Design
This dissertation’s research design is quantitative to answer the research question: how
can innovation policy outcomes in the form of other transaction authorities influence alternative
contracting activities to promote the development of innovative technologies and products?
Campbell initially proposed the time-series quasi-experiment to examine the impact of an
intervention (McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger, & Hay Jr, 1980). Using the conventional
Campbell-Stanley notation, the time series quasi-experiment is diagramed as:
…OOOOOXOOOO…
In this diagram, the O signifies an observation of a time series, while the X signifies a
distinct intervention. The time-series quasi-experimental design examines OTs’ utilization by the
DoD based on contract award information. In its application, the O denotes the observations of
all other innovation policies codified, and the X indicates the DoD OT authority 10 USC 2371b
(Pub. L. No. 114-92, 2015). A quantitative approach can estimate relationships among a set of
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constructs (Creswell, 2009). In other words, quantitative research uses statistical analysis to test
hypotheses experimentally (Creswell, 2009; Remler, 2011; Singleton & Straits, 1993). By
empirically examining the innovation policy outcomes, this pilot study will investigate how
innovation policy outcomes influence alternative contracting activities to promote the
development of innovative technologies and products.
The following are three sets of hypotheses relevant for answering this dissertation’s
research question. The cooperative model depicted Chapter II (see Table 2) will be used as a lens
for this study. The following three hypotheses are in support of the research question for this
dissertation
H1: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the number of
awards and total dollars obligated of DoD prototype OT agreements.
H1A: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the
number of awards of DoD prototype OT agreements.
H1B: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the total
dollars obligated of DoD prototype OT agreements.
This hypothesis examines the policy’s overall effect on DoD OT agreements, precisely
the number of prototype agreements. A delineation between these two types of OT agreements
matters because there are difference policies that govern R&D and prototype agreements.
Specifically, R&D agreements are defined in 10 USC 2371and prototype agreements are defined
in 10 USC 2371b. This hypothesis ties to the research question because the prototype OTs are an
outcome of the 2015 policy. This hypothesis also links to the Cooperative Model because, in the
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OT process, the government plays a role in collaboratively developing technology for
commercialization through contract DoD awards to the private sector organization.
H2: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the number of
new companies and total dollars obligated to new companies getting awarded DoD
prototype OT agreements.
H2A: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the new
companies awarded DoD prototype OT agreements.
H2B: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the new
companies receiving total dollars obligated of DoD prototype OT agreements.
The second hypothesis examines the DoD’s concern with attracting more nontraditional
defense contractors wanting to do business with the DoD. This hypothesis ties to the policy’s
purpose and outcome, specifically in attracting nontraditional defense contractors as defined by
10 USC 2302(9). Like hypothesis 1, this hypothesis will examine companies awarded prototype
agreements. This hypothesis also ties to the Cooperative Model because some companies do not
have the resources to create innovative technologies.
H3: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the diversity of
product and service categories awarded DoD prototype OT Agreements.
The third hypothesis examines the products and service codes awarded and subsequent
changes based on the 2015 policy. An assessment of the diversity of products that are considered
innovative will be examined. This hypothesis ties to the research question because innovative
technologies and products should be an outcome of the 2015 policy. This hypothesis also
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connects to the Cooperative Model because, in the OT process, the government plays a role in
collaboratively developing technology and innovative products for commercialization.
Data Collection Methods
FPDS-NG is the source for the data because FPDS-NG reports contracts whose estimated
value is $10,000 or more, including every modification to the respective contract, regardless of
dollar value. It was used as a source outside of a common data collection source, because FPDSNG provides procurement data to USASpending.gov, resulting in updated raw data on contract
awards without including any grant or loan information that would be covered with
USASpending.gov.
The data used for analysis is publicly available, meaning it is data generated for purposes
other than this research (Singleton, 1993). The dataset was downloaded on 24 April 2021, from
an online query form (FPDS-NG) website using three search criteria: 1) keyword “other
transaction agreement, 2) defining the “Award Type” field as “other transaction agreement, and
3) defining “Department Full Name” field as “Dept of Defense”. Using these keywords, the
query resulted in 8,769 records from 2008 – 2020. The dataset included both types of DoD OTs
and reported contract information such as:
1. Contract action information (e.g., contract number, contract modification number, the
type of contract, and dollars obligated under the contract actions),
2. Procuring agency information (e.g., contracting agency unique identification number
and the contracting agency name),
3. The purchased product or service information (e.g., the product or services code
(PSC) type, the PSC, and the PSC description), and

38
4. The contractor’s information (e.g., vendor name, vendor North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) code, Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number,
and vendor address).
Operationalization of Variables
The raw data used from FPDS-NG captures details about OTs and provides a longitudinal
data set that can capture how the enactment of specific innovation policy can result in outcomes
such as an increase in OT agreements, an increase in new companies doing business with the
government, and an increase in innovative (technology-based) products. To operationalize the
data into variables, the following Table 3 provides the variable name and description related to
each respective hypothesis in support of the research question.
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Table 3
Operational Table of Variables by Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the number
of awards and total dollars obligated of DoD prototype OT agreements.
Variable

Definition & Source

OT Agreements –
Total (Monthly)

Total number of DoD OT contract awards and contract
modifications annually (2008 –2020) Source: FPDS-NG

Prototype OT Agreements –
Total (Monthly)

Total number of DoD prototype OT contract awards and contract
modifications monthly (2008 – FY2020) Source: FPDS-NG

$ obligated OT Agreements –
Total (Monthly)

The total amount of dollars obligated for DoD OT contract awards
and contract modifications monthly (2008 –2020) Source: FPDSNG
Hypothesis 2: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the number
of new companies and total dollars obligated to new companies getting awarded DoD prototype
OT agreements.

Variable

Definition & Source

New Companies –
Total (Monthly)

The number of new companies, including nontraditional defense
contractors as defined by 10 USC 2302(9) awarded DoD OT
contract awards monthly (2008-2020). Source: FPDS -NG

$ obligated OT Agreements –
Total (Monthly)

The total amount of dollars obligated for DoD OT contract awards
and contract modifications annually to new companies monthly
(2008 –2020) Source: FPDS-NG

Prototype OT Agreements to
new companies –
Total (Monthly)

Total number of DoD prototype OT contract awards and contract
modifications to new companies including nontraditional defense
contractors as defined by 10 USC 2302(9) awarded DoD OT
contract awards and companies already doing business with the
government dollars obligated monthly (2008 –2020) Source: FPDSNG

Hypothesis 3: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the
diversity of product and service categories awarded DoD prototype OT Agreements.
Variable

Definition & Source

Products/Services –
Total (Monthly)

Number of product/service categories awarded on DoD OT contract
awards monthly (2008 –2020) Source: FPDS-NG

DoD prototype OT
Products/Services –
Categorical (Monthly)

Types of DoD prototype OT product/service categories awarded on
DoD OT contract awards monthly (2008 –2020) Source: FPDS-NG
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Description of the Sample
The sample of data used was raw data downloaded from FPDS-NG on 24 April 2021.The
FPDS-NG data reported by the DoD and is publicly available. The convenience of the data is a
major advantage, and it helps mitigate risk associated with data collection and documentation.
To process the data appropriately and to ensure that the method of analysis was applicable, the
data was summarized using the Pivot Table feature in Microsoft Excel to run simple queries.
The first query examined the number of Contracting Agency’s and their contract data.
The downloaded data set included 8,587 records of total contract actions (i.e., contract awards
and contract modification) totaling nearly $39 billion obligated nominal dollars. Table 4 below
provides a breakdown of these numbers by contracting agency as well as the sum of obligated
dollars for each agency.
Out of the 8,587 records, only 1,852 were unique values identifying a DoD OT contract
award. In other words, from May 2008 – December 31, 2020, DoD awarded 1,852 other
transaction agreements and the remaining 6,735 were the respective modifications to those
awarded OTs. This information was identified by applying the “Remove Duplicates” feature in
Microsoft Excel within the Contract ID column. Using the same feature, information regarding
the awarded vendors was captured. Over the 13-year period, the 1,852 unique contracts have
been awarded to 1,013 unique vendors 6. This information was verified by running various pivot
table queries using Microsoft Excel.

6 One vendor Advanced Technology International had one Vendor DUNS and two Global DUNS. For purposes of this study, the Vendor DUNS was used as the identifier for the
awarded vendors.
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Table 4
Contracting Agency Contracted Summary
Contracting Agency

Total # of OT
Contract
Actions

Total Dollars
Obligated

Dept of the Army

4,409

$30,195,196,488.14

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

1,546

$2,160,016,064.11

Dept of the Air Force

1,008

$4,348,989,521.24

Dept of the Navy

807

$956,647,076.03

Washington Headquarters Services (WHS)

268

$604,004,943.80

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

147

$77,607,065.12

Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

146

-$61,536.52

Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense

67

$76,362,833.79

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

57

$71,474,930.20

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

45

$165,546,961.09

Missile Defense Agency (MDA)

32

$129,948,980.00

Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency

21

$74,477,660.36

USTRANSCOM

14

$86,550,915.38

Defense Logistics Agency

13

$1,696,960.00

7

$3,605,364.65

8,587

$38,952,064,227.39

U.S. Cyber Command
Grand Total

Note. This table summarizes the DoD agencies that have used the OT authority from 2008 –
2020. The Department of the Army is the leading DoD agency to use OT with a total number of
awarded contracts and modification of 4,409 totaling over $30B in obligated dollars.
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Establishing the basis of analysis for the agencies is important to understand which
agency within the DoD is most likely to use OT as a form of contracting. However, it does not
provide data to tie back to the public law used to direct the decision making and purpose of OTs.
To gain an understanding of this, it is important to run queries regarding the data focusing on the
vendors that are being awarded. As mentioned previously, 10 USC 2371b states that the DoD
must ensure that prototype OTs meet at least one of the criteria; the significant contributing
parties are either nontraditional defense contractor or small business. At least one third of the
total cost of the prototype projects is to be paid out of funds provided by parties to the transaction
other than the Federal Government, or the senior procurement executive for the agency
determines in writing that exceptional circumstances justify the use of an OT.
Examining this information is important and performing a simple pivot table analysis can
provide interesting insights. Table 5 shows the top ten awarded vendors based on Contract ID
count includes ten companies with at least 50 contract actions (this includes original award and
modifications).
Last, an analysis of the items procured was completed by reviewing the PSCs. Table 6
shows that the top ten awarded PSCs based on contract actions (this includes original award and
modifications).
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Table 5
Top 10 Awarded Vendors Based on Total Contract Actions
Vendor DUNS

Vendor Name

Total # of OT
Contract Actions

Total Dollars
Obligated

025172953

Advanced Technology International

827760138

SOSSEC, Inc.

758

$902,376,274.73

079799555

Consortium Management Group, Inc.

482

$1,747,809,840.61

180035768

National Center for Manufacturing
Sciences, Inc.

320

$864,797,067.05

079639398

Defense Energy Center of Excellence

225

$380,159,662.87

079981146

Medical Technology Enterprise
Consortium

200

$342,969,834.76

080331419

Defense Automotive Technologies
Consortium

107

$266,733,884.17

794598573

Raytheon Company

82

$254,737,663.80

078824783

Pivotal Software, Inc.

81

$218,058,411.25

963411066

Consortium For Energy, Environment
and Demilitarization

80

$215,067,959.07

1097 $19,815,056,065.44

Note. This table shows that the top ten awarded vendors based on Contract ID count with at least
50 Contract ID counts (including contract awards and contract modifications). The vendor with
the most awarded contract actions is Advanced Technology International with over 1,000
awarded contract actions from 2008 – 2020.
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Table 6
Top 10 Awarded PSCs Based on Total Contract Actions
PSC

PSC Description

Total # of OT
Contract
Actions

Total Dollars
Obligated

AD92

Other Defense (Applied/Exploratory)/
R&D- Defense Other: Other (Applied
Research/Exploratory Development)

1460

$1,400,334,710.20

AC54

Weapons (Engineering)/ R&D- Defense System:
Weapons (Engineering Development)

1027

$10,730,577,143.83

AD94

Other Defense (Engineering)/
R&D- Defense Other: Other (Engineering
Development)

720

$3,192,877,867.58

AD91

R&D- Defense Other: Other (Basic Research)

625

$586,674,308.73

AD93

Other Defense (Advanced)/
R&D- Defense Other: Other (Advanced
Development)

360

$1,308,369,574.35

AZ14

R&D- Other Research and Development
(Engineering Development)

289

$414,448,298.25

AZ11

R&D- Other Research and Development (Basic
Research)

273

$211,734,373.69

AZ12

R&D- Other Research and Development (Applied
Research/Exploratory Development)

217

$980,857,526.63

AZ13

R&D- Other Research and Development
(Advanced Development)

209

$364,119,993.98

6910

Training Aids

200

$303,407,768.50

Note. This table shows that the top ten awarded PSCs based on Contract ID count (including
contract awards and contract modifications). The PSC with the most awarded contract actions is
AD92 - Other Defense (Applied/Exploratory)/R&D-Defense Other: Other (Applied
Research/Exploratory Development) with over 1,400 awarded contract actions from 2008 –
2020.
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The benefit of this data is that it provides several years of longitudinal data from 2008 –
2020. It is important to note that in 2020 the government updated the PSC Manuals and retired
hundreds of PSCs many of which were used during 2008 – 2020.
This overview information describes the overall of the data and highlights interesting data
points to assess whether innovation policies, specifically 10 USC 2371b (Pub. L. No. 114-92,
2015), influenced the DOD alternative contracting activities to promote the development of
innovative technologies and products and fill the gap of academic and practitioner bodies of
knowledge. To examine if time series analysis is appropriate it is important to understand how
many contract actions (contract award and modifications) have occurred over the time span. To
assess the time in a time-series manner, another query was run using the Pivot Table feature in
Microsoft Excel to examine if there was any type of linear trend among all the DoD OT contract
awards over the course of twelve years. As a characteristic of time series data, the data must be
in a sequence taken over equally spaced time. Table 7 provides a review of how the DoD
awarded OT contract actions. Based on a visual review of the data, there is variation among the
years. In 2017 one can see that there is a significant spike in the number of contract actions
compared to the previous years. Comparing the number of contract actions totaling 366 in 2016
to 597 in 2017 resulting in a 63% increase in DoD OT contract actions.
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Table 7
DoD OT Contract Actions by Year
Year

Award

Mod

Grand Total

2008

2

1

3

2009

5

26

31

2010

17

58

75

2011

17

155

172

2012

23

127

150

2013

12

161

173

2014

16

213

229

2015

21

266

287

2016

35

331

366

2017

101

496

597

2018

265

732

997

2019

551

1,462

2,013

2020

787

2,707

3,494

1,852

6,735

8,587

Grand Total
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Data Cleaning Procedures
Once the data was downloaded, it went through a systematic data cleaning and
interpretation techniques required before running the analysis. Data cleaning is essential to
identify any missing data or errors within the data set (Singleton, 1993). To begin the data
cleaning process, all blank columns were removed. Prior to deletion, all blank columns were
verified using filtering techniques in Microsoft Excel and grouping mechanisms to ensure all
columns were truly blank. The data cleaning procedure and steps were recorded in a protocol
document to ensure the results could be replicated and can be found in Appendix 4.
Data Analysis Procedures
A time-series analysis uses historical data over time (Remler, 2011), making time series
analysis different from cross-sectional studies. The overarching objective of time series analysis
is to determine an appropriate model to describe a data pattern (Adhikari & Agrawal, 2013;
Ramseyer, Kupper, Caspar, Znoj, & Tschacher, 2014). The model chosen in this study describes
essential features of the time series pattern, explain how the past actions affect future actions,
forecast values, or identify a control standard for quality.
Using interrupted time-series research can provide insight to monitor policy outcome by
examining the effects of innovation policy enactment on prototype agreements. Using this quasiexperimental method, interrupted time-series analysis offers a practical way of evaluating the
impact of already-implemented policies on outcomes. It is beneficial when a specific
intervention has occurred at a particular time. The researcher’s role is to assess whether the
interruption had an impact on specific outcomes. Interrupted time-series designs resemble onegroup pretest-posttest design, except multiple observations before and after (Singleton & Straits,
1993, pp. 251-252). It is crucial to have the treatment applied systematically by using a naturally
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occurring intervention such as policy changes or other social changes. For example, “if a law had
an impact, one would expect an ‘interruption’ or discontinuity in the time series…at the point
where the law was introduced” (Singleton & Straits, 1993, p. 250). This study will use the 2015
enactment of 10 USC 2371b as the interruption. Information regarding the impacts of changes in
policies is essential to both policymakers, industry, and practitioners.
Limitations
A limitation of this study is internal validity because more than one event could produce
the disruption. This dataset is an official record, and it is crucial to verify that the record-keeping
procedures or any reporting requirements have not changed. The primary benefit of this method
is that it is useful for controlling problems of invalidity. As examined with the sources used for
this study, DoD has exceptions to reporting and guidance on tracking the information. The
regular updates to defined terms, PSC categorization, and reporting guidance can prove difficult
for practitioners, policy makers, and academics to build a model using historical data.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The purpose of this dissertation is to assess whether innovation policies, specifically 10
USC 2371b (Pub. L. No. 114-92, 2015), influence the DoD alternative contracting activities to
promote the development of innovative technologies and products and fill the gap of academic
and practitioner bodies of knowledge. This dissertation is based on publicly available data
obtained through an online query from the Federal Procurement Data System– Next Generation
(FPDS) -NG) website. Drawing from existing literature and using time series analysis, it is
hypothesized that there is a difference in OT awards over the years due to the change in policy.
Results Analysis
After the cleaning the data and removing the cooperative agreements and contract
modifications, Table 8 depicts the number of DoD prototype OT Awards from 2008 – 2020 to
answer the research question and respective hypotheses. The data analysis and results described
below relies on the 1,852 records, as displayed in Table 8.
Based on the information captured in table above, no R&D OT awards were awarded
based on FPDS-NG database. This table also depicts the total dollars obligated of Prototype OT
Awards from 2008 – 2020. It is important to note that the data in Table 8 represents prototype
OT awards from the old authority, Section 845 of the FY1994 NDAA, and the authority being
examined in this study, 10 U.S.C 2371b of the FY2016 NDAA. The rows in blue signify the
contract activity related to 10 U.S.C 2371b of the FY2016 NDAA.
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Table 8
DoD OT Prototype Agreement Awards
Year

Prototype OT Awards

Prototype OT Total Dollars Obligated*

2008

2

$54,400,492.00

2009

5

$10,159,563.74

2010

17

$60,273,400.17

2011

17

$26,085,023.10

2012

23

$28,901,836.72

2013

12

$7,171,153.35

2014

16

$9,824,842.50

2015

21

$49,852,914.10

2016

35

$377,649,495.72

2017

101

$142,242,205.83

2018

265

$1,161,481,671.51

2019

551

$1,289,722,477.14

2020

787

$3,771,908,520.51

Grand Total

1,852

$6,989,673,596.75
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The dollars obligated in Table 8 were adjusted to the equivalent value in 2008 using the
Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic Product (indicated by the asterisk in the table
column). Using the GDP deflator, the dollar amounts were deflated using the following equation
using the GDP deflator provided in Table 20:
[Dollar amount]in $Year ×

GDP in $2008
= [Dollar amount]in $2008
GDP in $Year

An example of the calculation is provided below:
375K in $2010 ×

94.801 in $2008
= 370K in $2008
96.128 in $2010

For more information on data cleaning processes, please see Appendix 4.

H1: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the number of
awards and total dollars obligated of DoD prototype OT agreements.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 was passed on November
25, 2015, nearly two months into the government fiscal year. Since the passing of the FY2016
NDAA, which codified 10 U.S.C 2371b, the number of prototype awards has increased each
year. In 2017, the number of awards increased threefold totaling 101 awards compared to only
35 awards in 2016. In the following years, the number of awards doubled annually as illustrated
in Figure 2. The average annual growth rate (AAGR) 7 from 2008 to 2015 is 63% compared to
114% for 2016 -2020.

7

Average annual growth rate (AAGR) is the average annualized return of an investment, portfolio, asset, or cash flow over time. AAGR is
calculated by taking the simple arithmetic mean of a series of returns.
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Figure 2
DoD Prototype OT Awards (2008–2020)

Note. The graph illustrates the DoD Prototype OT award information with the orange line
depicting the year in which 10 USC 2371b was codified.

The Department of the Army had the most contract awards totaling 743 new OT
prototype awards from 2008–2020. However, since 2015 the Department of the Army increased
the number of awards from 17 to 253 from 2016–2020, respectfully. DARPA was second with
372 awards from 2008–2020, increasing their awards from 13 to 136 from 2016–2020,
respectfully. It is important to note that several new agencies started awarding prototype OT
agreements after 2015, including OUSDA, DISA, DLA, MDA, USCYCOMM, USTRANSCOM,
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and DTRA. These agencies are considered

53
new since before 2015, these nine agencies had not previously awarded DoD prototype OT
agreements, as shown in Table 9.
Table 9
DoD Prototype Awards by Agency (2008–2020)
Contracting Agency

‘08 - ‘15 ‘16

‘17

‘18

‘19

‘20

Dept Of the Army

50

17

73

145

205 253

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

55

13

21

70

77

Dept Of the Navy

2

0

0

20

112 156

Dept Of the Air Force

2

5

6

19

69

140

Washington Headquarters Services (WHS)

0

0

0

9

47

40

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

4

0

1

1

21

29

Immediate Office of The Secretary of Defense

0

0

0

0

5

17

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

0

0

0

0

4

8

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

0

0

0

0

2

5

Missile Defense Agency (MDA)

0

0

0

0

4

0

U.S. Cyber Command

0

0

0

0

2

1

USTRANSCOM

0

0

0

1

1

1

Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency

0

0

0

0

2

0

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

0

0

0

0

0

1

113

35

101

265

Grand Total (Annual)

136

551 787
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H1A: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the number of
awards of DoD prototype OT agreements.
Hypothesis H1A focuses on the total number of the awards from 2008 through 2020. OT
awards changed dramatically in December of 2015 when 10 U.S.C 2371b was passed and the
months following this policy change. In the 95 months prior to the full implementation, only 110
OTs were award. Most months saw no awards (38%) or a single award (32%). A few months
saw two (17%) or even three (11%) but only three months saw four or more awards (range 4-9).
In contrast, in the 61 months that followed there were 1741 OT awards made and rarely (<10%)
were there no awards or only one award distributed (n=4 and 1, respectively). In fact, following
the intervention a majority (60%) of months saw 10 or more awards and about 30% of months
saw 30 or more OT awards. The average number of OT awards prior to the implementation was
1.2 (s.d.=1.4) and rose to 28.5 (s.d. = 34.1) following the passing of 10 U.S.C 2371b.
As mentioned previously, interrupted time series analysis was used to test each of the
hypotheses in this study. Given that the number of awards is highly skewed and that there is
heterogeneity in the variance over time two ARIMA models were used, the first in its original
metric and the second using the natural log of number of awards (see Table 10). Each model
includes a constant, a linear trend (month), a dichotomous variable indicating pre (coded 0) and
post (coded 1) and a linear component that begins with the change in policy—this is the critical
variable in the model. Both models were used for all the hypothesis tested below. The effect of
the policy change is not just statistically significant but has a robust effect increasing the
explained variance by 44% in the first and by 16% in the second logged model.
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Table 10
Pre-Post Time Series ARIMA Model DoD Prototype OT Awards

Constant
Linear Trend
Pre-Post
Linear Post

Original Metric
Estimate
SE
0.491
3.178
0.014
0.057
-14.937
5.065
1.33
0.126

R-Square
Change the linear post

0.801
0.438

Ljung-Box Q

111.61 w 18 d.f. p<.001

**
***

Natural Log of Total Award
Estimate
SE
0.298
0.128
*
0.006
0.002
**
-0.14
0.203
0.055
0.005
***
0.802
0.155
36.85 w 18 d.f. <.01
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In reviewing these finding, there is strong evidence to support Hypothesis H1A. In
ARIMA models presented in Table 10, the findings show statistical significance increase in the
linear posttest, suggesting that that the passing of the policy in 2015, did increase the number of
DoD prototype OT agreements.
H1B: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the total dollars
obligated of DoD prototype OT agreements.
Hypothesis H1B focuses on the total dollars obligated for DoD prototype OT awards
from 2008 through 2020. OT awards changed drastically in December of 2015 when 10 U.S.C
2371b as passed which, it when the intervention began. In the 95 months prior to the full
implementation, only 110 OTs were award with a total of $182.7 million dollars obligated. Most
months saw no awards (38%) or a single award (32%). A few months saw two (17%) or even
three awards (11%) but only three months saw four or more awards (range 4-9). In contrast, in
the 61 months that followed there were 1,741 OT with a total of $6.6 billion dollars obligated.
Looking further into the data, the average value of an award prior to the interruption was $1.6
million of obligated funds. and after the interruption it increased to $56.6 million obligated
funds, a 3,157% increase. The linear post-test (see Table 11) is statistically significant increasing
the number of awards by just over $5.7 million each month, on average. The effect of the policy
change is not just statistically significant but has a substantial effect increasing the explained
variance by 11% in the first and a small effect by in the second logged model 0.5%.
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Table 11
Pre-Post Time Series ARIMA Model DoD Prototype OT Awards ($)

Constant
Linear Trend
Pre-Post
Linear Post
R-Square
Change the linear post
Ljung-Box Q

Original Metric
Estimate
SE
2,976,987
31,561,134
(21,954)
570,920
(70,985,783)
50,298,931
5,755,221
1,247,905
0.227
0.109
5.716 w 18 d.f. p 0.997

**
***

Natural Log of Total Award
Estimate
SE
4.797
1.232 ***
0.066
0.022
**
1.568
1.964
*
0.053
0.049
0.369
0.005
16.697 w 18 d.f. p 0.544
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Similar to the previous hypothesis, there is strong evidence to support Hypothesis H1B.
In the first ARIMA model presented in Table 11, the findings show a statistical significance
increase however, after the log transformation of the data there was support for this hypothesis
suggesting that after the passing of policy in 2015, there was an increase in the total dollars
obligated of DoD prototype OT agreements.
H2: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the number of
new companies and total dollars obligated to new companies getting awarded DoD
prototype OT agreements.
The purpose of this hypothesis is to test the companies awarded DoD OT agreements and
the diversity of the organizations awarded those agreements. Using the DUNS unique identifier
for each company, the data coded all first time OT agreement awards as ‘1’ and removed all
duplicate records to capture only the first awards for each company. By coding the data this way,
the analysis included only the number of new entrants from 2008 – 2020. New companies are
defined as organizations that are recent entrants to DoD OT agreements. These companies
include nontraditional defense contractors as defined in 10 USC 2302(9), and traditional defense
contractors. Examining new companies awarded DoD OT agreements applies to innovation
policy because it can provide insight to the diversity of organizations winning awards like DoD
OTs and more. Using a similar method of analysis, the dollars obligated were examined for the
first instance of obligation and removed from all duplicate records to capture only the total value
of the first year the company won a contract.
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Figure 3
Number of New Companies Awarded DoD prototype OT Agreements

H2A: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the new
companies awarded DoD prototype OT agreements.
Hypothesis H2A specifically looks at new companies awarded prototype OT agreements.
Examining FPDS-NG data, Figure 3 illustrates that the total number of new companies awarded
DoD prototype OTs increased significantly, from 28 to 385 throughout 2016 - 2020. Based on
the data illustrated in Figure 3, hypothesis H2A is supported because the graph shows an increase
in new companies awarded DoD prototype OT agreements. The AAGR from 2008 to 2015 is
63% compared to 94% for 2016 -2020.
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Hypothesis H2A focuses on the total number of the awards from 2008 through 2020
given to new companies that have not been previously awarded these contracts. The diversity of
companies changed drastically in December of 2015 when 10 U.S.C 2371b passed which, is
when the intervention began. In the 95 months prior to the full implementation, only 78 new
companies were awarded DoD prototype OTs. Most months saw no new companies (53%) or
only one new company was a awarded a DoD prototype OT award (49%). In contrast, in the 61
months that followed there were 935 new companies were awarded DoD prototype OTs and
rarely was there a month that had no new company awards (<1%). Furthermore, following the
intervention a majority (51%) of months saw 10 or more awards to new companies and about
30% of month saw 20 or more OT awards. The linear post-test (see Table 12) displays a
statistically significant increase in the number of new companies being awarded DoD Prototype
OT awards each month. The effect of the policy change is not just statistically significant but has
a strong effect increasing the explained variance by 23% in the first and by 15% in the second
logged model.
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Table 12
Pre-Post Time Series ARIMA Model DoD Prototype OT—New Companies

Constant
Linear Trend
Pre-Post
Linear Post

Original Metric
Estimate
SE
0.464
1.66
0.007
0.03
-5.308
2.646
0.62
0.066

R-Square
Change the linear post

0.609
0.229

Ljung-Box Q

100.923 w 18 d.f. p 0. <0.001

*
***

Natural Log of Total Award
Estimate
SE
0.276
0.122
**
0.004
0.002
*
0.001
0.194
0.046
0.005 ***
0.757
0.145
53.129 w 18 d.f. p <0.001
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Examining the results presented in Table 12, there is support of Hypothesis H2A. In both
ARIMA model, the findings show a statistical significance increase. This hypothesis is intended
to further dive into the results from Hypothesis 1 and to review the impact of the policy on new
companies receiving DoD OT awards. Based on the results presented above, there is support
that following the codification of 10 U.S.C 2371b there was an increase in the new companies
receiving DoD prototype OT agreements.
H2B: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the new
companies receiving total dollars obligated of DoD prototype OT agreements.
Hypothesis H2B looks at new companies awarded prototype OT agreements. Examining
FPDS-NG data, Figure 4 shows that DOD obligated a total of $5.54 billion in prototype OT
awards to new companies from fiscal years 2016 through 2020. Based on the data illustrated in
Figure 4, hypothesis H2B is supported because the graph shows an increase in new companies
awarded DoD prototype OT agreements. The AAGR from 2008 to 2015 is 140% compared to
296% for 2016 -2020.
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Figure 4
Dollars Obligated to New Companies Receiving DoD prototype OT Agreements

Hypothesis H2B focuses on the total dollars obligated to new companies awarded DoD
prototype OT awards from 2008 through 2020. The diversity of companies changed drastically
in December of 2015 when 10 U.S.C 2371b as passed which, rather when the intervention began.
In the 95 months prior to the full implementation, only 78 new companies were awarded DoD
prototype OTs with a total of $153 million dollars obligated. Most months saw no new
companies (53%) or only one new company was a awarded a DoD prototype OT award (49%).
In contrast, in the 61 months that followed there were 935 new companies were awarded DoD
prototype OTs with a total of $3.2 billion dollars obligated and rarely was there a month that had
no new company awards (<1%). In fact, following the intervention a majority (51%) of months
saw 20 or more awards and about 30% of month saw 20 or more OT awards. After running the
interrupted time series analysis to test the hypothesis, the effect of the policy change is
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statistically significant but does not have a substantial effect increasing the explained variance by
10% in the first and a small effect by in the second logged model 1%.
Examining the results presented in Table 13, there is evidence to support Hypothesis
H2B. In the first ARIMA model, the findings show a statistical significance increase post the
interruption however, after the model was logging the second model did not provide support that
was statistically significant. This hypothesis is intended to further dive into the results from
Hypothesis 1 and to review the impact of the policy on new companies receiving DoD OT
awards. Based on the results presented below, there is support that following the codification of
10 U.S.C 2371b there was an increase in the new companies receiving total dollars obligated of
DoD prototype OT agreements.
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Table 13
Pre-Post Time Series ARIMA Model DoD Prototype OT—New Companies ($)

Constant
Linear Trend
Pre-Post
Linear Post
R-Square
Change the linear post
Ljung-Box Q

Original Metric
Estimate
SE
2,636,410
13,994,136
(21,308)
253,145
(24,867,922)
22,302,890
2,499,073
553,328
0.234
0.103
10.162 w 18 d.f. p 0.926

Natural Log of Total Award
Estimate
SE
4.437
1.271 ***
0.053
0.023 **
1.767
2.026
0.077
0.05
***
0.348
0.01
15.060 w 18 d.f. p 0.658
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H3: Following the policy implementation in 2015, there was an increase in the diversity of
product and service categories awarded DoD prototype OT Agreements.
The purpose of this hypothesis is to examine the PSCs associated with DoD prototype OT
agreements and the diversity of the product and service categories awarded by those agreements.
PSCs are a measure of diversity, and the impact of innovation policy, because the government
categorizes all the products and services purchased by these codes. Using the PSC unique
identifier for each contract, the data coded all first time a PSC with a “1” and duplicate records
were removed to capture only the first awards for each PSC. By coding the data this way, only
the number of newly introduced PSCs were analyzed from 2008 – 2020. A similar methodology
was used in which dollars obligated were analyzed for the first instance they were mentioned and
removed all duplicate records to capture only the total value of the first year the company won a
contract.
Hypothesis H3 examines new product service categories (PSCs) awarded in prototype
OT agreements. Examining FPDS-NG data, Figure 5 illustrates the total number of new PSCs
awarded DoD prototype OTs increased significantly from 9 to 60 from 2016 - 2020. Based on
the data illustrated in Figure 5, hypothesis H3B is accepted because the graph shows an increase
in new PSCs awarded DoD prototype OT agreements. The AAGR from 2008 to 2015 is 31%
compared to 97% for 2016 -2020.
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Figure 5
PSCs Awarded as DoD prototype OT Agreements

An analysis of the PSCs from 2008 – 2020 provides a review of types of products and
service categories procured with DoD Prototype OT agreements. As DoD includes more PSCs,
there is a clear growth in company diversity with the unique offerings coming into the agency.
This is important to recognize for the encouragement of competition and overall improvement of
product offerings in the marketplace. The top category based on the data is PSC AD92 - Other
Defense (Applied/Exploratory)/R&D- Defense Other: Other (Applied Research/Exploratory
Development). The activity for this PSC highly increased from 9 to 205 total awards from 2016
– 2020. The second most awarded PSC is AD91 - R&D- Defense Other: Other (Basic Research)
with 1 – 49 awards from 2017 – 2020.

68
Hypothesis H3 focuses on the diversity of products purchased by the government using
PSC associated with DoD prototype OT awards from 2008 through 2020. OT awards changed
dramatically in December of 2015 when 10 U.S.C 2371b as passed which, it when the
intervention began. In the 95 months prior to the full implementation, only 21 new PSCs were
award with a total of $59 million dollars obligated. In contrast, in the 61 months that followed
there were 152 new PSCs were awarded with a total of $510 million dollars obligated. Looking
further into the data, the average value of an award prior to the interruption was $624 thousand
of obligated funds. and after the interruption it increased to $8.3 million obligated funds, a
1,230% increase. The effect of the policy change is statistically significant and has a substantial
effect increasing the explained variance by 18% in the first and by 13% in the second logged
model.
In reviewing these findings, there is strong evidence to support Hypothesis H3. In the
ARIMA models presented in Table 14, the findings show statistical significance increase in the
diversity of product and service categories awarded DoD prototype OT Agreements after the
intervention in the linear posttest.
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Table 14
Pre-Post Time Series ARIMA Model DoD Prototype OT—New PSC

Constant
Linear Trend
Pre-Post
Linear Post

Original Metric
Estimate
SE
0.272
0.264
-0.001
0.005
-0.168
0.421
0.081
0.01

R-Square
Change the linear post

0.559
0.177

Ljung-Box Q

24.338 w 18 d.f. p 0.144

***

Natural Log of Total Award
Estimate
SE
0.173
0.085
*
-0.001
0.002
0.181
0.135
0.024
0.003 ***
0.608
0.133
17.216 w 18 d.f. p 0.508
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Discussion of the Results
This dissertation seeks to empirically examine how innovation policies influence
alternative contracting activities to promote the development of innovative technologies
and products. Due to the need of product diversity and challenges facing contracting efficiency,
it is important to understand if the OT system is proving to be positive following the recent
policy changes. To investigate this exact issue, the hypotheses’ examined the amount of dollars
obligated, awards given, and diversity of products and services following the 2015 policy
implementation. Based on the results and the three hypotheses examined, there is support for the
research question because the statistical analysis of the award data of OTs showed an increase in
the number of DoD prototype OT awards, new companies getting DoD prototype OT awards,
and diversity of products awarded from 2016-2020 compared to 2008-2015.
For this study, innovation policy is described as any policy that promotes innovation.
This definition includes policies that directly support innovation using funding mechanisms such
as grants, contracts, or indirect support such as incentive tax (Vonortas et al., 2014). Three policy
paradigms can be used to examine the US’s approaches to innovation policy: the market,
mission, and cooperative models (Bozeman, Crow, & Tucker, 1999). For purposes of this
dissertation, the cooperative model is a model in which the government has a more active role in
performing research and developing innovative technology and products for private-sector
consumption or by merely being a funding vehicle for R&D efforts.
Unlike the procurement contract which is aligned with the mission model (Bozeman,
Crow, & Tucker, 1999), OTs intend to provide benefits to the DoD such as attracting new
companies, establish a network for resources to develop and/or obtain innovative technologies,
and provide an instrument for the DoD to influence technology and innovation. This is at the
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core of the cooperative model which has been growing in popularity almost in parallel with
DoD’s effort to promote innovation through the expansion of OT authority (See Table 16 for
detailed legislative history).
The need to measure impact of OT authority on public procurement has not only been the
focus of academic and practitioner literature, but it was also highlighted by Congress as a
recommendation in the 2019 CRS Report R45521. Several government reports have tried to
examine the use of DoD OT agreements and their usage. Each of these reports looking at certain
years using data from publicly available sources like this study, specifically FPDS-NG. Award
data for DoD R&D in FPDS-NG was consistent throughout the years because FPDS-NG does
not include DoD R&D data. After discussions with experts and a review of DoD public
documents, the DoD implemented a deviation to the rule through C-Note: 20-03 which states all
Research OTs, including modifications, are to be reported in Financial Assistance Award Data
Collection System (“FAADC”), effective July 2019. Prior to that, the DoD recorded R&D OTs
in the Defense Assistance Awards Data System (DAADS). Having various deviations and
process adjustments throughout the years has an impact on the completeness of data available to
the public and can create a validity issue if the Administrative Agreements Officer is not
reporting accurately. It will be interesting to see if reporting requirements for R&D and
Prototype OT agreements will be adjusted again.
An important observation of the data is the fluctuation in the number of DoD prototype
OT awards and the associated dollars obligated annually. The fluctuations may be a result of
authority expansion since National Defense Authorization Act of FY2016 (PL 114-92) which
permanently codifies OTs in 10 USC 2371b, thereby rescinding the authority under Sec 845,
redefines and codifies nontraditional defense contractors in 10 USC 2302(9), and expands
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follow-on production. Two years later, National Defense Authorization Act of FY2018 (PL 11591) added education and training requirements, increased approval thresholds, included language
to clarify the approval levels applicable to OTs, and included express authority to allow for the
award of Prototype OTs in the SBIR program and non-profit research institutions. Additionally,
the FY2018 NDAA broadened the follow-on production language to include individual subawards under an OT consortium. Lastly, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act
for FY2019 (PL 15-232) removed USD (AT&L) as the highest-level approver and replaced it
with USD (A&S) or USD (R&E) and clarified the application of follow-on production authority
for projects carried out through CMFs. It is difficult to capture changes based on these policies,
because it is not possible to differentiate prototype and production DoD OTs like you can
between R&D and prototype OTs. Based on conversations with experts the government does not
have intentions to update the PIID nomenclature at this moment.
Another big focus of practitioner and academic literature is the government being able to
attract new companies and nontraditional defense contractors to do business with the DoD. Per
10 U.S.C. 2302(9)) nontraditional defense contractors are defined as an entity that has not
worked or is not currently working with the government. This definition was updated the same
year 10 U.S.C. 2371b was codified to provide more clarification regarding the definition of
nontraditional defense contractors. One may defer that only small businesses would qualify
under this definition, but in fact many large businesses also qualify. In fact, as provided in
Chapter III, the top contractors receiving OT prototype awards are consistent with the Top 100
Federal Contracts as reported by FPDS-NG. This guidance changed the definition creating a
hardship for contracting officers attempting to further define if the awarded company qualifies
under the definition, especially with the addition of the language “and the regulations

73
implementing such section, for at least the 1-year period preceding the solicitation of sources by
DoD for the procurement” 10 U.S.C. 2302(9)). Now, contracting officers must contend with both
large and small businesses, leading to more competition and time in the contracting process and
again making it difficult to differentiate the status of the contractor winning DoD OT
agreements.
Another interesting observation is the number of Consortium Management Firms (CMFs)
being awarded OT agreements. A CMF is defined as “an association of two or more individuals,
companies, or organizations participating in a common action or pooling resources to achieve a
common goal and can range from a handful to as many as 1,000 members. A consortium does
not have to be a legal entity but must be legally bound through some form of teaming agreement
or Articles of Collaboration” (Department of Defense Inspector General, 2021, p. 3). The privity
of contract is with the prime entity doing business with the government; thus, reporting may not
identify the performing party, only the managing party in the agreement. In other words, in a
traditional principal-agent framework the agent would typically perform the work under the
contract arrangement. In a consortium, the agent is the contracting party, but they have an
agreement in which a third party is performing the work. This raised concerns in a recent U.S.
Department of Defense Inspector General’s report titled Audit of Other Transactions awarded
through Consortiums (Date April 21, 2021) Report No. DODIG-2021-077 and the results of this
study showed that the top three awarded companies include consortia such as Advanced
Technology International, SOSSEC, Inc, and Medical Technology Enterprise Consortium.
The 2021 DoD IG report used a sample of thirteen base OT awards valued at $24.6
billion from 2017 – 2018 and found that these awards were not properly tracked, were not
awarded in accordance with applicable laws and regulation and were not consistent in
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negotiations of fees (Department of Defense Inspector General, 2021). The recommendations of
the report provided that the DoD needs to develop policies for awarding and tracking OTs that
are awarded to CMFs. These policies were intended to reinforce guidance, provide best practices,
clarify current policies, establish controls for proper vetting, and develop procedures to review
solicitations provided to CMF members. As stated previously, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment is expected to release an updated OT guide for DoD in
2022 and it is suspected guidance will be provided in the updated manual.
Lastly, the purpose of OTs is to bring innovative products and technology to the
government for their use and commercialization. Like the concerns of regular policy changes and
requirement updates through internal agency documentation, PSCs may be the most reliable
measure across agencies on the product and service categorization. The most awarded PSCs have
been retired as of 10/29/2020. Since 2015, over 839 PSCs have been retired, and 815 of those
codes were retired on October 29, 2020, comprised of, 741 R&D PSCs, 27 IT PSCs, and the 17
remaining PSCs included maintenance, quality control, inspection, and leasing of equipment. In
accordance with the Federal Procurement Data System Product and Service Codes (PSC) Manual
dated October 2020, the 741 R&D PSCs that start with the letter “A” are being replaced by 155
new R&D PSCs that start with “A”. Additional updates were made activating 23 new IT service
PSCs and 17 new IT product PSCs. It is important to note that, these PSC categories are used
across all Federal Departments, not just the DoD.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The purpose of this pilot study was to assess whether innovation policies, specifically 10
USC 2371b (Pub. L. No. 114-92, 2015), influence the DoD alternative contracting activities to
promote the development of innovative technologies and products and fill the gap of academic
and practitioner bodies of knowledge. Drawing from existing literature and using interrupted
time series analysis to examine publicly available contract data in FPDS-NG, this pilot study
sought to answer the following research question: how can innovation policy outcomes in the
form of other transaction authorities influence alternative contracting activities to promote the
development of innovative technologies and products? This pilot study concludes with the
Collaborative Model application for DoD prototype OT agreement to promote innovation using
alternative contracting methods.
Innovation policy is a term that encompasses any policy that promotes innovation, which
can include funding mechanisms such as grants, contracts, or indirect support such as incentive
tax programs for the private sector matching the private firm’s expenditure with public funding
(Vonortas et al., 2014). The government can directly support innovation through robust
innovation policies that leverage grants and contracts who has controlled agency (Vonortas et al.,
2014). The federal government generally uses procurement contracts, which are contracts that
are awarded according to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), to procure goods and
services. However, innovation policy has also been known to promote alternative contracting
vehicles such at Other Transaction Authorities.
The motivation behind OTs is to help the public authority organizations get driving edge
innovation from private sector sources utilizing an adaptable, objective arranged way to cultivate
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new partnerships through open private associations. The three principal advantages of OTs to the
private sector are, a decreased cost and time of the acquisition process, an increase in negotiating
power for intellectual property rights, and more cooperation between the public and private
sector (Schwartz & Peters, 2018). This push for more cooperation between sectors, and even
between private sector firms, positions the cooperative model (Bozeman, Crow, & Tucker, 1999)
as a lens in which we can examine innovation policies similar to those promoting alternative
contracting methods such as OTs. Twelve agencies currently have the authority to issue OTs.
For this dissertation, the focus was the DoD because R&D and defense acquisition has
assumed a significant part in propelling a wide assortment of innovations including, among
others, PCs and related semiconductor advancements, correspondence, media transmission,
aviation, and photonics. Additionally, the DoD has increased their annual budget significantly
over the last decade and is the largest defense budget in the world. For context, from 2008 –
2020, the DoD awarded 1,852 Prototype OT awards totaling $7B obligated funds (deflated using
the Implicit Price Deflator for Gross Domestic Products).
The attractiveness of OTs is that they are an alternative contracting method to traditional
procurement contract. OTs promote shared interests between the public and private sectors
through Congress’s innovation policies. For example, Congressional actions that expanded
definitions of nontraditional defense contractors to include small businesses and increasing the
scope of prototype projects (Pub. L. No. 113- 291, 2014) influence how DoD implements these
policies. Additionally, these policies influence alternate contracting methods (i.e., OTs) to
promote innovative technologies and products. This study examines the policy passed in 2015 in
which Congress made OT authority permanent by codifying the law at 10 USC 2371b (Pub. L.
No. 114-92, 2015). By using the cooperative model as a lens to examine how innovation policies
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such as 10 USC 2371b influence DoD alternate contracting activities, this dissertation allows
researchers to explore how innovation policy promote innovative technologies and products.
The published OT literature reviewed was either practitioner-oriented (Bloch & McEwen,
2001; Dix, Lavallee, & Welch, 2003; Dunn, 2017; Kuyath, 1995; Vadiee & Garland, 2018),
theory based (Schooner, 2002), or metrics based (Fike, 2009). The literature in peer reviewed
journals was focused on barriers for DoD’s ability to keep pace with security needs in the current
environment (Bell, 2014; Bonvillian & Van Atta, 2011; Michèle & Robert, 2016; Nunez, 2017;
Peter, 2013; Steinberg, 2020; Steipp & Bezos, 2013), and the legal and administrative systems
that govern OTs (Gunasekara, 2010; Nathaniel, 2019; Nikole, 2019; Selinger, 2020; Victoria
Dalcourt, 2019). Although these research subjects are important when discussing OTs, none of
the OT literature reviewed attempts to systematically identify and discuss the impact of
innovation policy on the DoD’s use of OTs.
Summary of Results
The results of this study show that innovation policy outcomes influence alternative
contracting activities to promote the development of innovative technologies and products.
The ARIMA models examined the role of the 2015 policy, 10 U.S.C 2371b, on DoD prototype
OT awards, new companies receiving those awards, and the diversity of products and services
associated with those agreements. All the hypotheses were supported: H1, H1A, H1B H2, H2A,
H2B and H3. There was strong evidence that after the passing of the policy in 2015, the number
of DoD prototype OT agreements and the diversity of product and service categories awarded
increased. Two of the hypotheses H1B and H2B resulted in a substantial increase after the policy
passing in original metric model, but not in the logged model. This may be indicative of the
dollar values being a deeper dive of the DoD prototype OT data supporting the results of the
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hypotheses examining the number of awards. In other words, this is a secondary analysis diving
into the additional data associated with OT awards and could have potential autocorrelation.
Something future research should take into consideration when applying interrupted time series
analysis.
Through the lens of the cooperative model, this policy has able to have an impact in both
influencing the use of alternative contracting methods and the development of innovative
technologies and products. The policies themselves have room to grow through the early success
of initial attempts. As some were proven more applicable than others, studies like these are
necessary to enhance our knowledge base while encouraging change for more innovation. While
continued research would allow for clearer results, the forward momentum and clear growth
should not be ignored.
From 2015 – 2020, the DoD significantly increased its use of prototype OTs in terms of
number of DoD prototype OT awards and the amount of funds obligated for DoD prototype OTs.
Nearly seventy percent of the dollars’ obligated were awarded to two traditional defense
contractors and to three consortiums. The driving force for these changes is from the FY 2016
NDAA provision which expanded OT authority (10 U.S.C 2371b) to include follow-on
production. Prior to 2015, DoD OT authority only covered R&D OT agreements and all
prototype authority was granted through Section 845 agreements. This meant that once a
capability was developed that could move to full production, the government would have to use a
traditional FAR-based contract. As a result of Congress codifying 10 U.S.C. 2371b in FY 2016
NDAA, follow-on production effort could be awarded without having to issue a traditional FAR
based contract. under
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Additional policy changes also affected the use of OTs in DoD. In the 2016 NDAA,
Congress authorized the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR) to award
prototype OTs, provided clarification for OT approval levels within DoD and increased approval
thresholds, and mandated additional training requirements. Following these changes many DoD
agencies such as the Army Contracting Command saw an increase in cross-service use of OT
capabilities however, there was no impact on overall OT adoption. Congress addresses this
challenge in 2017, by including in the NDAA a mandate to increase the collection, storage, and
reporting of OT usage data.
Other major contributing factors that may have impact on OT utilization are initiatives
related to the Unites States near peer adversaries such as China and Russia. The DoD has been
focused on addressing these threats specifically targeting acquisition speed and intellectual
property (IP) considerations. According to one study, the threat of China’s massive IP purchases
is costing the Unites States nearly $600 billion a year (Huang & Smith, 2019). OTs provide a
mechanism for companies doing business with the government to have negotiation power when
it comes to IP. By promoting a more cooperative relationship between government and industry,
the concerns related to IP can be reduced if proper legal language is used and both parties have
mutual agreement on licensing rights. Additionally, since the COVID-19 pandemic government
agencies have been able to see the benefit of research initiated using OTs through the rapid
development of the COVID-19 vaccine which was a result of an OT (Soloway, Knudson, and
Wroble, 2020). These environmental changes and policy changes external to the US example
demonstrate the importance of government involvement in supporting innovative research and
development of technology hence while supporting the cooperative model of interpretation.
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Implications for Researchers and Practitioners
This dissertation provides a framework of thought for academic researchers and
practitioners to examine innovation policy but will need additional qualitative data to expand on
the findings herein. Due to regular policy updates, deviations, authority expansion and limitation
it can be difficult to measure the effectiveness of a policy if policy makers do not look at data
prior to revising current policy and/or introducing new policy. Significant steps are necessary to
ensure that OT authorities achieve their purpose and impact is measured in accordance with the
policy objectives.
The authority provided by 10 USC 2371b gives the contracting officers’ decision-making
power outside of the procurement contract method, allowing more flexibility in their decision
making. This flexibility is highly dependent on the contracting officer. As pointed out by
Montagnes and Wolton (2017), “… a principal can choose a rule-based regulatory framework.
However, unlike discretion, rules do not adapt to circumstances and are thus inefficient.”
(Montagnes & Wolton, 2017, p. 457). However, the argument in favor of the procurement
contract method is that it provides a detailed process to ensure accountability and transparency.
Policymakers require valid and relevant data to support their decision making, a gap highlighted
throughout 2019 CRS Report R45521.
The implications of this study show how important it is to have a centralized system and
procedures for reporting contract data and being ensuring that the same type of data is being
tracked. For example, having R&D and prototype OT agreements reported in different systems
can make it challenging for agencies assess the impact of a contracting method and track the
product development through the product development lifecycle. The second implication of this
study is related to the regular changing guidance, regulation, and definitions associated with
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DoD OT agreements. These regular updates make it hard to have a consistent classification
system for reporting and differentiate between prototype and production DoD OT agreement as
well as traditional versus nontraditional defense contractors. Lastly, the issue of transparency of
the performing entity on a contract is echoed in the 2019 CRS Report R45521 and the 2021
DODIG-2021-077 reports. Although this is not a novel issue in public procurement, it is
heightened with OTs because there is so much scrutiny when it comes to CMFs.
Interrupted time series analysis can examine the impact of a policy change after
implementation, identify the changes the policy initiated, and illustrate any changes in the
outcome over time. Providing information about the impact of policy can be essential in policy
development. This includes bringing in data that is housed in other DoD databases such as
DAADs and now FAADC. Additionally, mapping the PSCs to their appropriate categories and
possibly providing clarification or simplification to how products and services are categorized is
a necessary effort.
In Public Administration, the changes resulting from innovation policy increase supplier
diversity, thus supporting a continuous government acquisition goal to avoid company
monopolization. In the procurement space, more dollars obligated, and efficient processes lead to
sustained improvements, more outcomes, and technological advancements that can be built upon.
The development of innovative technologies has a cyclical tie to our innovation policy, with one
affecting the other, to promote new and positive outcomes within the procurement space. This
implies moving towards efficient procurement timelines and defense technologies based on
continuously updating innovation policies.
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Limitations and Delimitations
A potential limitation of this study is internal validity because more than one event could
produce a disruption of the current results. This dataset is an official record, and it is crucial to
verify that the record-keeping procedures or any reporting requirements have not changed. While
a certain level of error is expected, a thorough cleaning process is necessary to combat potential
invalid information for the clarity of the study. The primary benefit of this method is that it is
useful for controlling problems of invalidity. As examined with the sources used for this study,
DoD has exceptions to reporting and guidance on tracking the information. The regular updates
to defined terms, PSC categorization, and reporting guidance it can be difficult for practitioners,
policy makers, and academics to build a model using historical data.
The three ways of mitigating threats to internal validity include special design features,
examining additional data, and using theory to identify if a particular risk is not an alternative
explanation (Singleton & Straits, 1993). In other words, in quasi-experimental designs, it is vital
to identify potential issues and consider how to rule out their threat by using a systematic
approach. For example, one method that can be applied is the use of a pretest. The pretest benefit
is that it provides an initial examination of the data to observe if there are any evident differences
(Singleton & Straits, 1993). Also, it gives a first look at the data being used to examine if there
are any problems the research design and methodology approach could experience. Identifying
these issues early in the process enables a better analysis of the data and could save time for the
researcher. This dissertation used a pre-test as a tool to mitigate threats of internal validity by
testing the data to observe any differences.
Another limitation to consider is the time variable for pre-policy and post-policy analysis
because the time span is not equal. The pre-policy timeframe is from 2008 – 2015, a total of
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eight years. However, the post-policy time frame is from 2016 – 2020, which is only a five-year
time span. To further evaluate the policy impact of 10 USC 2371b, this analysis should be
replicated the next five years or within the next ten years to have an equal number of years after
the interruption for a better pre-and post-analysis.
A major delimitation is biasing from both the originators of the data for government
reporting and the interpretation of the data. Additionally, the R&D environment and DoD
demands have changed with the political climate and the tenuous situations in Congress. Another
delimitation of this data is the exclusion criteria of the observed OTs. The data set selected does
not include OTs awarded by NASA, Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of
Transportation (DOT) because this study focuses on DoD policies and data. Another delimitation
of the study is that the scope will be bound to only the new OTs award and not contract
modifications. The data set provides information on the dollars obligated; however, it does not
provide the government’s actual amount of those obligated dollars for each individual OT
agreement. The lack of information related to the government’s actual funds is a delimitation
because one cannot measure the actual dollars spent during the performance of the OT
agreement. Another delimitation of the study is the method of analysis because an interrupted
time series does not explain why a policy has or has not affected outcomes in an intended
manner. However, the interrupted time series does provide empirical evidence of the relationship
between policies and changes in outcomes.
Recommendations for Future Research
This study scratched the surface of available points of interest. Delving deeper into the
effects of policy changes on current contracting methods has the potential to expand our
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capabilities, technologies, and efficiency. As a recommendation, future studies are necessary to
assess how much cooperation occurs between government and the private sector. Although, the
DoD has the authority the use of OTs is not consistent across all agencies. In fact, the two
agencies (Army and DARPA) dominate the number of awards from 2008 - 2020. Further review
may indicate policy adoption readiness by agency and organizational inconsistencies. This is
important because although the DoD OT authority has increased scrutiny, it has not been viably
compared to other authorities to measure its effectiveness. Thus, additional research may show
other gaps or successes in the policy that may indicate where the policy could be improved.
Academic research in areas of public administration, business administration, economics,
law, and other sciences can support such research by focusing on the importance of the topic.
Many academic institutions do not include a focus on acquisitions and many public
administration journals do not highlight acquisition, public procurement, or innovation policy
topics like their counterparts in economics and law. Using academia to further assess policy and
contribute to the policy writing and measuring policy effectiveness may improve adoption
ratings among agencies and provide valuable metrics to promote more innovation policy.
A replication of this study in five to ten years will be essential to see if the trends in this
study will be observed in the long term. Using time series analysis provides an ability to forecast.
Therefore, researchers can use time series data in the past to predict future values of the
dependent variables (Remler, 2011). If a proper time-series analysis is completed, being able to
forecast OT award based on the data can be beneficial for policy makers. This allows policy
makers to understand how changes to the policy can affect the decision making of contracting
officers. It can also provide insight to the discretion used by contracting officers as more
documentation is provided in clarifying the utilization and application of OTs. How can this be
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applied? In November 2018, the Defense Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment stated
that the DoD plans to release another revision to the DoD Handbook on the use of OTs
(Edwards, 2018). Depending on the impact of this revision, a model can forecast how this
clarification will affect OT awards in the upcoming year(s). This is a way that decision makers
can take a glance at the future. What is more innovative than being able to predict the future?
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APPENDIX B
IMPORTANT TERMS, ACRONYMS, AND DEFINITIONS
Table 15
Important Terms, Acronyms, and Definitions
Key Term

Acronym

Definition

Transaction

The entire process of interactions related to, entering into an
agreement, executing, and transitioning a prototype project.

Procurement Contract

A contract awarded according to the Federal Acquisition
Regulation.

Prototype Project

The definition of a "prototype project" in the context of an OT is as
follows: a prototype project addresses a proof of concept, model,
reverse engineering to address obsolescence, pilot, novel
application of commercial technologies for defense purposes, agile
development activity, creation, design, development, demonstration
of technical or operational utility, or combinations of the foregoing.
A process, including a business process, may be the subject of a
prototype project.

Prototype

DoD generally describes a prototype as a physical, virtual, or
theoretical model used to evaluate the technical or manufacturing
feasibility, or effectiveness, of what is intended to come later. It
need not be a physical model; prototypes can involve designs,
novel applications of commercial technologies, demonstrations of
operational utility, and proofs of concept (source: Other
Transactions Guide, p. 31).

Other Transaction
Authority

Refers to the authority of the Department of Defense (DoD) to
carry out a particular prototype, research, and production projects.
OTAs were created to give DoD the flexibility necessary to adopt
and incorporate business practices that reflect commercial industry
standards and best practices into its award instruments (see 10 USC
2371b)

Other Transaction

Nontraditional
Defense contractor

OT

Refers to any kind of transaction other than a procurement contract,
grant, or cooperative agreement (See 10 USC 2371).

NDC

An entity that is not currently performing and has not performed,
for at least the one-year period preceding the solicitation of sources
by DoD for the procurement or transaction, any contract or
subcontract for the DoD that is subject to full coverage under the
cost accounting standards prescribed pursuant to section 1502 of
title 41 and the regulations implementing such section (see 10 USC
2302(9)).
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Table 15 Continued
Key Term

Acronym

Definition

Awardee

Any responsible entity that is a signatory to an OT agreement. A
sub-awardee is any responsible entity performing effort under the
OT agreement, other than the awardee.

Agreement

The mutually agreed terms and conditions of the parties to an OT.
Absent exceptional circumstances, it will take the form of a legally
binding written instrument.

Department of
Defense

DoD

The United States Department of Defense is an executive branch
department of the federal government charged with coordinating
and supervising all agencies and functions of the government
related to national security and the United States Armed Forces.

FAR

The Federal Acquisition Regulations cover many of the contracts
issued by the US Military and NASA. The largest single part of the
FAR is Part 52, which contains standard solicitation provisions and
contract clauses.

Federal Acquisition
Regulations

National Aeronautics
and Space
NASA
Administration

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is an
independent agency of the U.S. Federal Government responsible
for the civilian space program, as well as aeronautics and space
research. NASA was established in 1958, succeeding the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.

Defense Advanced
Research Projects
Agency

DARPA

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is a research and
development agency of the United States Department of Defense
responsible for the development of emerging technologies for use
by the military.

Federal Procurement
Data System - Next
Generation

The Federal Procurement Data System is a single source for US
government-wide procurement data. The Federal Procurement Data
FPDS-NG Center, part of the U.S. General Services Administration, manages
the Federal Procurement Data System, which is operated and
maintained by IBM.

Government
GAO
Accountability Office

The U.S. Government Accountability Office is a legislative branch
government agency that provides auditing, evaluation, and
investigative services for the United States Congress. It is the
supreme audit institution of the federal government of the United
States.

Cost Accounting
Standards

Cost Accounting Standards are a set of 19 standards and rules
promulgated by the United States Government for use in
determining costs on negotiated procurements. CAS differs from
the Federal Acquisition Regulation in that FAR applies to
substantially all contractors, whereas CAS applies primarily to the
larger ones.

CAS
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Key Term

Acronym

Definition

Bayh-Dole Act

The Bayh–Dole Act or Patent and Trademark Law Amendments
Act is United States legislation dealing with inventions arising
from federal government-funded research. Sponsored by two
senators, Birch Bayh of Indiana and Bob Dole of Kansas, the Act
was adopted in 1980, is codified at 94 Stat.

Department of Energy DOE

The United States Department of Energy is a cabinet-level
department of the United States Government concerned with the
United States' policies regarding energy and safety in handling
nuclear material.

Department of Health
HHS
and Human Services

The United States Department of Health & Human Services, also
known as the Health Department, is a cabinet-level executive
branch department of the U.S. federal government with the goal of
protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential
human services.

Department of
Homeland Security

DHS

The United States Department of Homeland Security is the U.S.
federal executive department responsible for public security,
roughly comparable to the interior or home ministries of other
countries.

DOT

The United States Department of Transportation is a federal
Cabinet department of the U.S. government concerned with
transportation. It was established by an act of Congress on October
15, 1966 and began operation on April 1, 1967. It is governed by
the United States Secretary of Transportation.

PPP

A public–private partnership is a cooperative arrangement between
two or more public and private sectors, typically of a long-term
nature. In other words, it involves government and business that
work together to complete a project and/or to provide services to
the population.

DCAA

The Defense Contract Audit Agency is an agency of the United
States Department of Defense under the direction of the Under
Secretary of Defense. It was established in 1965 to perform all
contract audits for the Department of Defense.

Department of
Transportation

Public Private
Partnerships

Defense Contract
Audit Agency

Defense Contract
DCMA
Management Agency

The Defense Contract Management Agency is an agency of the
United States federal government reporting to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. It is responsible for
administering contracts for the Department of Defense and other
authorized federal agencies.

Fiscal Year

A fiscal year is used in government accounting, which varies
between countries, and for budget purposes. It is also used for
financial reporting by businesses and other organizations. The time
spans from October 1st – September 30 of every year.

FY
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Key Term
National Defense
Authorization Act

Science and
Technology

Acronym

Definition

NDAA

The National Defense Authorization Act is the name for each of a
series of United States federal laws specifying the annual budget
and expenditures of the U.S. Department of Defense. The first
NDAA was passed in 1961.

S&T

Science and technology are an interdisciplinary topic encompassing
science, technology, and their interactions: Science is a systematic
enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of
explanations and predictions about nature and the universe.

Defense Contract
DCMC
Management Agency

The Defense Contract Management Agency is an agency of the
United States federal government reporting to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. It is responsible for
administering contracts for the Department of Defense and other
authorized federal agencies.

National Imagery and
NIMA
Mapping Agency

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is a combat support
agency under the United States Department of Defense and a
member of the United States Intelligence Community, with the
primary mission of collecting, analyzing, and distributing
geospatial intelligence in support of national security.

Office of the
Secretary of Defense

OSD

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is a headquarters-level staff
of the United States Department of Defense.

Commercial
Operation and
Support Savings
Initiative

The goals of the Commercial Operational and Support Savings
Initiative (COSSI) are to improve readiness and reduce operations
COSSI 97
and support (O&S) costs by. inserting existing commercial items or
technology into military legacy systems.
CRS

The Congressional Research Service, known as Congress's think
tank, is a public policy research institute of the United States
Congress.

NDAA

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is the name for
each of a series of United States federal laws specifying the annual
budget and expenditures of the US Department of Defense. The
first NDAA was passed in 1961.

North American
Industry
NAICS
Classification System

The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is
the standard used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying
business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing,
and publishing statistical data related to the US business economy.

Data Universal
Numbering System

The Data Universal Numbering System, abbreviated as DUNS or
D-U-N-S, is a proprietary system developed and managed by Dun
& Bradstreet that assigns a unique numeric identifier, referred to as
a "DUNS number" to a single business entity.

Congressional
Research Services
National Defense
Authorization Act

DUNS
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Key Term

Product Service
Codes

Acronym

PSC

Definition
Also referred to as federal supply codes, product service codes are
used by the United States government to describe the products,
services, and research and development purchased by the
government. Government procurement specialists and government
contractors alike require a solid understanding of these codes to
produce quality partnerships between buyers and suppliers.
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APPENDIX C
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Table 16
Department of Defense OT Authority Legislative History
Year

Policy

Description

1989

National Defense Authorization Act
for FY1990 & FY1991 (P.L. 101189)

Section 251 of the FY90 NDAA codifies the OT
authority for Defense Advanced Research Project
Agency (DARPA) in 10 USC 2371 for “Advanced
research projects” only.

1991

National Defense Authorization Act
of FY1992 & FY1993 (PL 102-190)

Section 826 repealed the temporary restriction and
made the authorities permanent. Section 821
authorized DoD to enter into cooperative and other
transaction agreements to develop critical
technologies.

1993

National Defense Authorization Act
of FY1994 (PL 102-160)

Section 845 of the FY94 NDAA expands DARPA’s
authority to include prototype development related to
weapons or weapons systems acquired by DoD. This
authority was to terminate after three years.

1996

National Defense Authorization Act
of FY1997 (PL 104-201)

Section 804 of the FY97 NDAA authorizes OTs for
the military services and designated officials and
extends the authority through 1999 (another three
years).

2002

National Defense Authorization Act
of FY2002 (PL 107-107)

Section 822 of FY2002 NDAA granted DoD the
authority to award follow-on production contracts to
prototype projects with the stipulation that at least
one third of the total cost of the prototype project is
paid by non-federal government sources.

2003

National Defense Authorization Act
of FY2004 (PL 108-136)

Section 847 of the FY04 NDAA expands the
definition of weapons system, authorizes pilot
program for follow-on contracting to produce
commercial items, and extends the authority through
FY2017.

2008

National Defense Authorization Act
of FY2008 (PL 110-181)

Section 824 of the FY08 NDAA expands the scope
of the NDAA FY04 pilot program and extends the
authority through FY2013.
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Year

Policy

Description

2009

National Defense Authorization Act
of FY2009 (PL 110–417)

Section 822 required DoD to issue guidance on rights
in technical data under non-FAR agreements,
including OTs.
Section 824 expanded the scope of the pilot program
for transition to follow-on contracts for certain
prototype projects to include research projects carried
out under 10 USC 2371.
Section 874 required OT data be included in the
Federal Procurement Data System.

2011

National Defense Authorization Act
for FY2011 (PL 111-383)

Section 866 changed the definition of nontraditional
defense contractor, conforming the definition to that
found in 10 USC 2302(9).

2012

National Defense Authorization Act
of FY2013 (PL 112-239)

Section 863 of the FY13 NDAA extends the
authority through FY2018.

2014

Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck”
McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2015 (PL
113-291)

Section 812 expanded OT authority to include
prototypes “directly related to enhancing the mission
effectiveness of military personnel and supporting
platforms, systems, components, or materials
proposed to be acquired or developed by the Depart
of Defense, or improvements of platforms, systems,
components, or materials in use by the Armed
Forces.”

2015

National Defense Authorization Act
of FY2016 (PL 114-92)

Section 815 of the FY16 NDAA permanently
codifies OTs in 10 USC 2371b, thereby rescinding
the authority under Sec 845, redefines and codifies
nontraditional defense contractors in 10 USC
2302(9), and expands follow-on production

2017

National Defense Authorization Act
of FY2018 (PL 115-91)

Section 863-864 of the FY18 NDAA added
education and training requirements, increased
approval thresholds, includes language to clarify
approval levels applied to OTs, includes express
authority to allow for the award of Prototype OTs in
the SBIR program and non-profit research
institutions, and broadens the follow-on production
language to include individual sub-awards under an
OT consortium
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Year

Policy

Description

2018

John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2019 (PL
15-232)

Section 211 of the FY19 NDAA removes USD
(AT&L) as the highest-level approver and replaces it
with USD (A&S) or USD (R&E) and clarifies the
application of follow-on production authority for
projects carried out through consortia; Section 873
provisioned for the collection, storage, use, and
reporting of OT usage data; the Joint Explanatory
Statement accompanying the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2019 (Public Law 115-245),
pages 153-154, established additional reporting
requirements

2019

Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2019 (PL 115245)

The enacted FY2019 defense appropriation bill did
not include language addressing OTs. The report
highlighted the concern for lack of transparency of
OTs. Also, the report advised the GAO to review
DoDs use of its use to determine any conflicts and
compliance with current regulations.
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APPENDIX D
DETAILED DATA CLEANING PROCEDURES
Once the data was downloaded from FPDS-NG, it was processed using data cleaning and
interpretation techniques required. Data cleaning is essential to identify any missing data or
errors within the data set (Singleton, 1993). To begin the data cleaning process, all blank
columns were removed. Prior to deletion, all blank columns were verified using filtering
techniques in Microsoft Excel and grouping mechanisms to ensure all columns were truly blank.
In addition to the blank columns, the following Columns were deleted as they were not necessary
for the analysis: Transaction Number, Solicitation Date, NAICS, NAICS Description, Additional
Reporting Code, Additional Reporting Description, Global DUNS Number, and Global Vendor
Name. Next, four observations were dropped that were before 10/14/2008 (10USC2371). The
Contract IDs include contract awards DAAE300190008, HDTRA10790002, HDTRA1079000,
and Task Order 129 (parent OT Contract ID DAAE300190008. An exception was made for one
record prior to 10/14/2008 because it was the original award for a contract that was awarded by
the US Army, Contract ID: W15QKN089000 which had 118 modifications from 2008 through
2020. Additionally, any OTs awarded in 2021 were removed because the time parameters of this
study are May 2008 to December 31, 2020. As a result, 158 records were removed from the data
set.
Next, three columns were created by the researcher to help answer the research question
(see Table 17). These three columns include: Award or Mod, Adj Action Obligations ($) 2008,
and R&D or Prototype. Columns that were not part of the original data set were color coded
green in the column header and tracked in the Data Set Code Book within the Excel Workbook
to keep track of researcher created columns for ease in replicating this study or reusing this data
set for future research.
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Table 17
Data Set Code Book
Field
Contract ID

Description
The contract numbers.

Reference
IDV

Award or Mod

A secondary ID for contracts. For this dataset, the parent contract to
the Task Order is tracked here.
A unique value of the modification to a contract. If this is the
original award, then the number is '0'. (Ex. Mod 1 would be P0001
or 1)
Is this an Award ("Award") or Modification ("Mod")?

R&D or
Prototype

Using the contract award information, this column identifies the
contract as an R&D agreement or as a Prototype Agreement

Award IDV
Type
Action
Obligation ($)
Adj Action
Obligation
($) 2008
Date Signed

Type of Agreement (Other Transaction Award, Other Transaction
Agreement, Other Transaction Award Other Transaction Order)
The net amount of funds (in dollars and cents) obligated or deobligated by this contract.
The adjusted net amount of funds (in dollars and cents) obligated or
de-obligated by this contract using the 2008 Implicit Price Deflators
for Gross Domestic Product.
The date that the transaction was signed.

Contracting
Agency ID
Contracting
Agency
Contracting
Office Name
PSC Type

This corresponds to the agency that awards the contract. This will
be defaulted to the agency that the contracting officer belongs to.
The appropriate four (4) digit agency or subagency identification
code.

Modification
Number

PSC
PSC Description
Vendor DUNS
Vendor Name
Vendor City
Vendor State
Vendor ZIP
Code

Source
FPDS
FPDS
FPDS
Author
Author
FPDS
FPDS
Author
FPDS
FPDS
FPDS

The contracting or funding office.

FPDS

Type of PSC, is it a Product (P) or Service (S)
Product or Service Codes (PSC) represents major products or
services offered by a business. The Classification PSC screen is
used as a reference table for award documentation.
Description of PSC
The Dun & Bradstreet D-U-N-S Number is a unique nine-digit
identifier for businesses and is assigned once Dun & Bradstreet’s
patented identity resolution process.
Name of private company that was awarded the contract
City of private company that was awarded the contract
State of private company that was awarded the contract

FPDS

Zip Code of private company that was awarded the contract

FPDS

FPDS
FPDS
FPDS
FPDS
FPDS
FPDS
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Note. This table provides the names and description of each column in the data set after data
cleaning. Columns that were from the original data set are marked by the source “FPDS.” Any
columns created by the researcher for purposes of this study are marked by the source “Author.”
The first new column was titled “Award or Mod” which coded a new contract award as
“award” and a modification to the award as “mod.” This coding was made referencing the
column titled “Modification Number” and coding all “0” as “award” and all others as
“modifications” Upon verification of this coding, it was observed that several contracts were
awarded with underlying Task Orders (“TO”). The FPDS-NG data set tracked the original
contract award similarly to all other contracts, however, when a TO was awarded under each
agreement, the Contract ID was recorded as the TO and the parent contract was recorded under
the column Reference IDV. The following contracts were tracked in this manner.
•

W15QKN1090006

•

W912HZ1990001

•

W81XWH1590001

•

W15QKN209P004

•

W15QKN189P001

•

W900KK2090002

•

N666041890001

•

N004211990001

•

N652361890001

•

W15QKN199P003

•

W900KK1890005

•

W56HZV209D001

•

N001641990001

•

W15QKN199P002

•

M678541899000

•

N652362090004

•

W52P1J1995023

•

N652362090002

•

FA86041994050

•

W15QKN209P950

•

W15QKN199P011

•

N652362190001
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•

HQ0034209P001

•

W9132T209D001

•

N613311990004

•

W52P1J2194100

For purposes of this research, the Task Orders were coded as all other OT awards for consistency
in the data analysis.
The second column created by the researcher was titled “Completed the Adj Action
Obligation ($) 2008” which adjusted all the dollars obligated in column “Action Obligation ($)”
to the equivalent value in 2008 using the Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic Product.
Adjusting all dollar values upward into real 2021 dollars to account for inflation could bias the
post-2015 years upward. Using a 2008 base and the GDP price deflator helps address this issue.
Using the GDP deflator, the dollar amounts were deflated using the following equation:
[𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎]𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 $𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 ×

𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 $2008
= [𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎] 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 $2008
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 $𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌

An example of the calculation is provided below:
375𝐾𝐾 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 $2010 ×

94.801 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 $2008
= 370𝐾𝐾 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 $2008
96.128 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 $2010

The last column created by the researcher titled “R&D or Prototype” identified the
contract award as either an R&D agreement or a Prototype Agreement based on the Federal
Procurement Instrument Identifier (“PIID”). Each PIID (Solicitation or Award number) is
comprised of thirteen alphanumeric characters. Characters 1 through 6 identify the department,
agency, unit, or organization that has issued the solicitation. Effectively, these six digits are
Activity Address Code (AAC) that is unique for every federal agency. Looking at these you
know who the potential buyer of your services or goods is. Characters 7 through 8 are the last
two digits of the fiscal year in which the solicitation is issued or awarded. The character at
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position 9 is a capital letter or number that identifies the Instrument type (solicitation or award).
These alphabetic codes are regulated under Federal Acquisition Regulation FAR Part 4.1603
which are defined as:

•

A = Blanket Purchase Agreement

•

B = Invitation for Bid

•

C = Contracts (except Indefinite Delivery Contracts

•

D = Indefinite Delivery Contracts

•

F = Task Orders, Delivery Orders, or Calls under Indefinite Delivery Contracts, Blanket
Purchase Agreements, or Basic Ordering Agreements

•

G = Basic Ordering Agreements

•

H = Basic Agreements and Loan Agreements

•

L = Lease Agreements

•

P = Purchase Orders

•

Q = Request for Quotations

•

R = Request for Proposals

As mentioned previously, OTs are not procurement agreements. The numeric codes that apply to
OTs are regulated by the DCMA Manual 2501-08: Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Other
Transactions 8. The following is the coding found in the DCMA Manual.

8
DCMA Manual 2501-08: Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Other Transactions; Dated March 14,2019, Section 5: Other Transactions (OT)
pages 22-23. Retrieved from: https://www.dcma.mil/Portals/31/Documents/Policy/DCMA-MAN-2501-08.pdf
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•

1 = Grant

•

2 = Cooperative Agreement

•

3 = R&D Other Transaction Agreement

•

9 = Prototype Other Transaction Agreement

Characters 10 to 17 identify the agency-wide solicitation/award number to keep track of
all solicitations issued so far. The issuing agency chooses the exact number of digits varying
from four to eight depending on the approximate solicitations to issue within this
solicitation/award type. Figure 7 provides an illustration of the PIID formatting described above.
It is also important to note that there are two different types of a modification. The “P”
identifies that this modification is issued by the procuring contracting office. The numeric values
“00001” identify that this is the 1st modification. (Ex: P00001). The “A” identifies that the
modification is issued by the administration contracting office. The numeric values “00001”
identify that this is the first modification. (Ex: P00001). Figure 8 illustrates of the modification
formatting.
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Figure 7
Federal “Procurement Instrument Identifier” or “PIID” Format

Note. This illustration provides a visual representation on how to read the Procurement
Instrument Identifier (PIID). Adapted from McMartin, B. “How to Read a Federal Solicitation or
Award Number called a PIID.” June 2020, Slide 1.
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Figure 8
Modification Format

Note. This illustration shows the differentiation of the type of contract modifications. Adapted
from McMartin, B. “How to Read a Federal Solicitation or Award Number called a PIID.” June
2020, Slide 3.
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Using this numeric code, the character in the ninth position determines if the OT was an
R&D Agreement or Prototype Agreement. A column titled R&D or Prototype was created to
code the contract types, Table 18 shows the results after the coding. Using this table, three
modifications to two contracts (W56HZV0720001 & W56HZV0420001) were removed from the
OT dataset because their PIID identified them as Cooperative Agreements.
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Table 18
DoD OT Agreement Awards and Modifications
Contract Type

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Grand
Total

2 - Cooperative
Agreement

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

Award

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Mod

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

0

0

1

2

0

2

0

0

0

1

3

4

3

16

Award

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

3

Mod

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

3

4

3

13

3

31

74

170

150

171

229

287

366

596

994

2,009

3,491

8,571

Award

2

5

17

16

23

11

16

21

35

100

265

551

787

1,849

Mod

1

26

57

154

127

160

213

266

331

496

729

1,458

2,704

6,722

3

31

75

173

151

174

229

287

366

597

997

2,013

3,494

8,590

3 - R&D OT
Agreement

9 - Prototype
OT Agreement

Grand Total
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Next, it was observed that the R&D agreements coded in the table above were not actual
R&D agreements. For example, Task Order 3 on Contract W15QKN1090006, Task Order 13 on
Contract W15QKN1090006, and Task Order 3 on Contract W81XWH1590001. Both parent
agreements were with the Department of the Army. Contract W15QKN1090006 was awarded to
Insitech, Inc. (DUNS 158252143) and Contract W81XWH1590001 was awarded to Medical
Technology Enterprise Consortium (DUNS 079981146). After the data cleaning, there were no
R&D OT Agreements in the data set and all records were recorded appropriately. By running the
PIID review of the parent agreements, it was evident that the data needed to be adjusted to reflect
all contract numbers under Prototype OT Agreements as shown in Table 19.
This dissertation is examining only new contract awards; thus all 6,722 records were
removed from the dataset for analysis. The data analysis and results are further described in
Chapter IV, titled Data Analysis and Results.

113
Table 19
DoD Prototype OT Agreements After Data Clean
Contract Type

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Grand
Total

9 - Prototype
OT Agreement

3

31

74

170

150

171

229

287

366

596

994

2,009

3,491

8,571

Award

2

5

17

16

23

11

16

21

35

100

265

551

787

1,849

Mod

1

26

57

154

127

160

213

266

331

496

729

1,458

2,704

6,722

27

Line
Line
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Gross domestic product
Personal consumption expenditures
Goods
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Services
Gross private domestic investment
Fixed investment
Nonresidential
Structures
Equipment
Intellectual property products
Residential
Change in private inventories
Net exports of goods and services
Exports
Goods
Services
Imports
Goods
Services
Government consumption expenditures and gross investment
Federal
National defense
Nondefense
State and local
Addendum:
Gross national product

2009

2010

2011 2012 2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

94.421

95.018

96.162 98.165 100 101.747 103.652 104.681 105.727 107.734 110.314 112.283 113.636

94.419 95.024 96.166 98.164 100 101.751 103.654 104.691 105.74 107.747 110.321 112.294 113.648
94.325 94.062 95.747 98.17 100 101.354 102.887 103.116 104.148 106.051 108.318 109.922 111.225
96.122 93.812 95.183 98.773 100 99.407
98.92 95.896 94.332 94.615 95.281 94.832
94.16
106.012 104.02 102.107 101.28 100 97.968 95.429 93.358 91.141
89.05 87.544 86.488 85.784
91.904 89.467 92.182 97.652 100 100.082 100.599 97.092 95.876 97.451 99.343 99.249 98.602
93.458 94.182 96.017 97.875 100 102.322 104.88 106.796 109.197 111.965
115.1 117.836 120.302
100.597 99.366 97.699 98.748 100 100.876 102.872 103.697 103.726 105.258 107.156 108.991 109.698
100.296 99.076 97.568 98.641 100 101.091 103.172 104.075 104.202 105.928 107.925 109.684 111.052
99.832 99.184 97.416 98.559 100 100.251 101.469 101.909 101.119 101.977 102.815 104.137 104.813
94.335 92.613 92.006 95.362 100 101.455 107.198 109.403 109.67 112.545 114.391 119.058 120.852
102.542 103.168 99.471 99.447 100 99.787 99.169 98.671 97.593 97.543 97.683 97.816 97.388
99.834 98.589 98.306 99.517 100 100.081 100.791 101.374 100.302 101.125 102.266 103.172 104.574
102.249 98.671 98.317 99.049 100 105.054 111.118 114.114 118.127 123.454 130.417 134.145 138.541
----------- --------------------------- ----------------95.493 89.803
93.35 99.237 100 100.148 100.216 95.373 93.458 95.897 99.135
98.66 96.188
95.67 88.908 92.952 99.793 100
99.32 98.312 91.323 87.772 90.058 93.274 91.792 88.162
95.083 91.745
94.23 98.001 100 101.987 104.466 104.431 106.155 108.934 112.212 114.082 114.517
98.796 87.852 92.656 99.716 100 98.697 97.961 90.144 87.058 88.996 91.515 90.078 88.075
98.972
86.54 91.961 99.869 100 98.059 96.752 87.644 83.999 85.883 88.267 86.389 83.963
97.963 93.763 95.891 98.987 100 101.841 104.018 102.981 102.856 105.069
108.3 109.262 109.82
93.343 92.921 95.391 98.289 100 102.363 104.47 104.638 104.899 107.389 111.319 113.246 114.861
94.42 94.193 96.425 99.069 100 100.933 102.643 103.143 103.695 105.702 108.776 110.781 112.018
94.801 94.126 96.128 98.946 100 100.609 102.056 102.334 102.65 104.306 107.149 108.865 110.039
93.713 94.308 96.951 99.284 100 101.481 103.621 104.466 105.37 107.902 111.325 113.775 115.108
92.59 92.045 94.674 97.747 100 103.332 105.698 105.656 105.739 108.524 112.984 114.863 116.725

2008

Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic Product (2008–2020)

Table 20
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APPENDIX E

IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATORS FOR GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (2008–2020)
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